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A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE
ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE:
Recognizing Povertyism
SHEILAGH TURKINGTON*
RdSUME
L'auteure soutient qu'historiquement, les gens vivant dans la pauvret6 ont W
victimes de discrimination syst~mique. La socidt6 a 6mis des suppositions
quant leur moralit6 A cause de leur pi~tre situation 6conomique. Elle soutient
qu'il faut 6tendre le Code des droits de la personne de lOntario de fagon A
inclure la discrimination se fondant sur la pauvret6 puisque celle-ci est simi-
lake au racisme, au sexisme, A la discrimination fond6e sur la capacit6 physi-
que, A l'hMt~rosexisme ou l'Igisme.
* Copyright © 1993 Sheilagh Turkington. Sheilagh Turkington is a third year law stu-
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Bruce Porter, and April Burey for their helpful review and comments.
A Proposal to Amend the Ontario Human Rights Code
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Povertyism 140
2. Outsider Jurisprudence 142
3. The Law and Povertyism 144
3.1 Legal Construction and Discrimination 144
3.2 Methodology: History from the Bottom 146
3.3 British Poor Laws 147
3.4 Poor Laws in Upper Canada 157
3.5 The Twentieth Century: An Emerging Social
Welfare System 161
3.6 Current/Recent Government Action 164
3.6.lUnemployment Insurance 164
3.6.2Where to Draw the Poverty Line 165
4. The Ontario Human Rights Code Route 168
4.1 Conducive Aspects of the Ontario
Human Rights Code 168
4.2 Potential Problems with the Ontario Human Rights
Code Route: The Rights Debate 172
4.2.1The Debate 172
4.2.2The Debate and the Addition of "Poverty" 177
5. Conceptions of Discrimination 177
5.1 Analyses of Discrimination 179
5.1.lCategorical Analyses 179
5.1.2Additive Analyses 181
5.1.31nteractive Discrimination 185
5.2 The Hetereogeneity of Povertyism 188
5.3 The Faces of Poverty 188
5.4 A Subjective Perspective of Discrimination 191
6. Conclusion 191
(1993) 9 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Dawn KearneyI is nineteen years old. She is pregnant and unemployed but her
husband, also a youth, is employed in a low income position and supports the
two of them. She and her husband were denied a tenancy in the rental unit that
they wanted because the landlord had income qualifications for accommoda-
tion in its rental units stipulating that applicants could not be paying any more
than 25% of their total income towards rent. Given that the rent for the
apartment was $650, the landlord was essentially requiring a minimum
income level of $30,000 of its tenants. After being refused accommodation,
Dawn Kearney and her husband unofficially took over a tenancy from their
parents in one of the landlord's other buildings. They have paid their rent on
time every month despite the fact that such payments constitute 47% of their
income.
An organization that serves some of the homeless people in downtown Toronto,
Street Health, interviewed 450 homeless people to examine issues of access to
adequate health care. Previous health care studies had excluded homeless
people because they were conducted through surveys that randomly selected
people with addresses and phone numbers. The study found that while home-
less people suffer from the same health problems as the general public, the
severity of these problems and the way in which they are able to respond to
them is determined by their living and economic circumstances.
The report noted several problems with access to health care. For example,
approximately seven percent of the respondents were refused health care
services because they did not have an Ontario Health Card and most of these
incidents occurred in hospital emergency departments.
Of those who were not refused, at least 40 percent had experienced an
"incident of attitudinal discrimination:"
Many individuals reported having experienced encounters with mainstream
health services which had been unsatisfying either because they had felt
humiliated or discriminated against because they were poor and homeless, or
because they had been given instructions or treatments that were impossible
to carry out due to living circumstances.2
1. Dawn Kearney v. Bramalea Ltd., Case No. 50-914B, Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission, from the files of Bruce Porter, Centre for Equality Rights in Accommoda-
tion, Representative for the complainant.
2. The Street Health Report, cited in Kathy Hardill, "Poverty and the Social Context of
Health" (1992) 12 Canadian Woman Studies 86.
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One example of such treatment instructions was bed rest. Hostels for the
homeless generally close during the day thereby precluding a homeless person
from being able to remain in bed.
Several of the respondents felt that they had been judged by health care staff
"because they did not have an address or a place of work to give to a
receptionis4 or because they may have looked dirty or dishevelled. " Most of
the people reporting this ill-treatment were female.
The report made several recommendations to improve access to and quality of
health care for people with low incomes. Several of the recommendations
focus on reforming the attitudes of health care workers:
The authors of the report recognize that attitudinal change is not easy, but
believe strongly that the impact of attitudinal barriers is as serious as those
related to structural or systemic barriers.
Jane Doe is a twenty-eight year old Black woman and sole-support mother of
two children. Her income consists entirely ofpublic assistance.
Last year, Jane applied for funding for the Ontario Student Assistance Pro-
gram to continue the undergraduate program she began last year. This year,
she received less funding despite the fact that her financial circumstances
remained unchanged. Since she had budgeted the year expecting the same
amount, this difference could preclude her from attending.
Jane went to the Student Awards office to inquire about the change and the
possibility of an appeal. She watched as the applicant before her, a white man
in his late teens, received encouraging comments from the Student Awards
officer who explained the appeal process to him and assisted him in filling out
all of the forms. The officer appeared quite helpful and supportive. When
Jane's turn came and the Awards Officer reviewed her application, Jane
noticed a marked change in attitude. The attitude of the Awards Officer
suggested that Jane did not deserve financial aid because he presumed she
would be unsuccessful. Jane was also clearly given the impression that she
was taking funding away from "more traditional" students who would make
the most of it because of their greater likelihood of success. He repeatedly
stressed that funding decisions were based on a very complicated process and
only explained the appeals process once Jane asked several questions
about it.3
3. Jane's story is based on the information in Carolyne A.Gorlick, "The Female Single
Parent Student" (1992) 12 Canadian Woman Studies at 55-7.
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Jane has also just moved out of the apartment she and her children were
sharing with another family into a smaller apartment with just her own family.
She has applied to have her phone line hooked up. Last year, the phone was in
another person's name and it has been a few years since Jane had an account
in her own name. The telephone company asked her several questions about
her employment history and source of income. The agent then informed her
that because the company does not have a record of a previous account from
her (they only consider the previous twelve months), she would be required to
put down a $100 deposit over and above the hook-up cost and the monthly
charge that is required at the beginning of each month of service. That $100
deposit would be held for at least six months. She informed the company that
she could not afford the deposit fee but could afford the service charges; while
the $100 might be relatively significant to many people, it was prohibitive to
her, given her financial circumstances. The agent informed her that the deposit
was mandatory and that it was in place to discourage people who establish an
account, run up an extensive long distance bill and then disappear.
INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 1992, representatives from the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty
(OCAP) emphasized to the Ontario Minister of Human Rights, Elaine Ziamba,
that the Ontario Human Rights Code's protection from discrimination in
accommodation on the basis of "receipt of public assistance" 4 is "woefully
inadequate." 5 This provision fails to acknowledge and protect against existing
widespread discrimination against all people in poverty, not just those in
receipt of public assistance, and not just in the area of accommodation.
Historically, people who live in poverty have been victims of systemic dis-
crimination. Politicians, the media, law makers and enforcers, religious speak-
ers, and the general public have stereotyped people in poverty, have made
assumptions about their moral character because of their low economic status
and have subjected them to unequal and often ill treatment. Even in an age of
political correctness, when public derogatory comments about people of vari-
ous disadvantaged groups are generally censured, such comments and con-
demnations of people in poverty and on public assistance remain rampant and
unchecked.
4. R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, s.2.
5. Personal interview with John Clarke of OCAP. Toronto: Ontario Coalition Against
Poverty, December 8, 1992.
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It is my position in this paper that the treatment that people in poverty are
subject to is a form of discrimination analogous to that of racism, sexism,
ablism, heterosexism, or ageism. The people facing such discrimination are
the most disadvantaged people in our society in terms of economic advantage
and therefore political advantage. They are the economically disadvantaged of
the recognized disadvantaged groups. Ironically, all but three Canadian
Human Rights Acts fail to acknowledge this form of discrimination and to
offer protection to its victims. The three that partially recognize this dis-
crimination, including the Ontario Human Rights Code, offer only limited
protection.6
The purpose of this paper is to argue for an expansion of the Ontario Human
Rights Code to include a ground of discrimination based on poverty. I will
refer to such discrimination as "povertyism ' 7 and I will begin this paper by
elaborating on what it is I am referring to when I use this term. Also in this first
section, I will emphasize that, throughout my paper, I intend to maintain a
bottom-up perspective such that my paper might contribute to the growing
body of jurisprudence identified by some as outsider jurisprudence.
In the second section of the paper, I will examine the historic and current
role of law and government in exacerbating povertyism. In this examina-
tion, I will focus specifically on the role that law plays in developing and
reinforcing povertyism. My main argument will be that law is a primary
agent in promoting povertyism and, as such, it might also be a primary
agent in alleviating it.
Having identified the problem of povertyism and the mechanisms which
contribute to and maintain it, I will, in the third section, enlarge on a strategy
for alleviating povertyism. I will consider the Ontario Human Rights Code and
the Commission as mechanisms for counteracting some of the prevailing
misconceptions and acts of povertyism. Furthermore, I will consider some
6. Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S 1989, c.214 ["receipt of public assis-
tance"]; Manitoba Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c.45, s.9 "source of
income" as an applicable characteristic with respect to freedom from differential
treatment].
7. I have adopted the word "povertyism" from a submission made to the House of
Commons Sub-Committee on Poverty which reported the following:
"Povertyism...is a reference to the prejudice and subsequent discrimination against
people who are poor. More than just low economic status, "poor" implies a kind of
moral inferiority, akin to racism or sexism."
See Jennifer Hyndman of the Income Security Action Committee of the Social Plan-
ning and Research Council of British Columbia, cited in Chris Axworthy, M.P.
(Social Policy/Anti-Poverty Critic), "Changing Course: An NDP Action Plan on
Poverty" (May 1992) at 30.
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of arguments against turning to a rights-mechanism like the Code. This
consideration will focus primarily on proponents in the "rights debate." Ulti-
mately, I will emphasize that the potential problems raised in this debate
would be averted by realizing two essential factors: 1) the reform of the
Ontario Human Rights Code to include "poverty" must be a process
engaged and directed by people in poverty and 2) achieving such reform
must be understood to be only one prong of a necessarily multi-pronged
strategy of eliminating poverty.
In the fourth section, I will examine categorical, additive and interactive
analyses of discrimination, ultimately emphasizing the need for a comprehens-
ive understanding of the interactive nature of discrimination and the heteroge-
neous nature of the poor. In the context of this discussion, I hope to illustrate
that as Human Rights tribunals and the courts generally move toward an
interactive conception of discrimination, as I foresee they will, the inclusion of
poverty in Human Rights Acts is essential. Its absence threatens that Human
Rights legislation will fail to adequately address the needs of the most eco-
nomically disadvantaged of disadvantaged groups.
1. Povertyism
In The Stigma of Poverty,8 Chaim Waxman discusses the way in
which poverty has become a stigma in much of Western society. 9
Working from the theories of Erving Goffman, Waxman notes that on
meeting someone for the first time, people quickly form impressions
as well as evaluations. When the person being met is somehow
different from ourselves, that difference is factored into our
impressions. When that different characteristic causes the observer
to reduce the person observed from a "whole and usual person to a
tainted, discounted one" then that characteristic is a stigma. 10
Poverty, Waxman argues, is one such characteristic. In fact, "the stigma of
poverty is a special type of stigma which attributes to the poor a status of
being "less than human."11 This argument is supported by several studies
conducted in the United States and Britain which have indicated that many
people perceive poverty to be the result of individual characteristics of
8. C. I. Waxman, The Stigma of Poverty: A Critique of Poverty Theories and Policies,
2nd ed. (New York: Permagon Press, 1983).
9. Ibid. at 69.
10. Ibid. at 69.
11. Ibid. at 70.
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people living in poverty. 12 Similar beliefs have been found to be held by
Canadians.13 So, for example, a common stereotype illustrating this stigma
would be that of the person on welfare as lazy and unmotivated, as a spend-
thrift in need of personal correction. The assumption is that poverty arises out
of lack of effort and thrift. Therefore, anyone who is poor must be lazy and
irresponsible. This logic stands behind povertyism: the logic translates incor-
rect assumptions about poverty into assumptions about the people who are
poor.
The social construction of stigma is a useful tool for the privileged in society.
Once stigmatized, people in poverty may then be characterized as anomalies in
society, as deviants. 14 In a capitalist society, constructing the poor as anoma-
lies to the reigning capitalist system reinforces the main principles of capital-
ism. A focus on the individual person in poverty as individually responsible for
his/her misfortune diverts any criticism of existing economic and political
systems as somehow culpable for the proliferation of poverty. Rather than
considering the possible shortcomings of the dominant capitalist ideologies
which have apparently provided some people in society with significant
wealth and promises to reward the hard work of many others, society instead
assumes personal shortcomings in the people who by their disadvantage
threaten the American or, in this case, the Canadian dream.
Michael Katz notes that the condemnation of people in poverty is inextricable
from our "culture of capitalism" which
"measures persons, as well as everything else, by their ability to produce
wealth and by their success in earning it; it therefore leads naturally to the
moral condemnation of those who, for whatever reason, fail to contribute or to
prosper. It also mystifies the exploitive relations that allow some to prosper so
well at the expense of so many."15
Essentially, as long as such condemnation continues, the structural nature of
the problem of poverty will never be adequately addressed. As Katz argues, the
12. See Free and Cantril, "The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opin-
ion" in Waxman, ibid. at 3; Feagin, Subordinating the Poor: Welfare and Ameri-
can Beliefs. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1975); Riffault & Rabier, The Perception of
Poverty in Europe (Brussels: Commission of the European Countries, 1977) at 71.
13. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 13 May 1988) at 29-32,510-11 [hereinafter Transitions].
14. See P. Spicker, Stigma and Social Welfare, (London: Croom Helm, 1984) at 166.
15. M. Katz. The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1989) at 7.
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focus on the individual diverts the focus on poverty away from the relations
between the poor and the non-poor which themselves contribute to poverty:
"Mainstream discourse about poverty, whether liberal or conservative, largely
stays silent about politics, power and equality. But poverty, after all, is about
distribution; it results because some people receive a great deal less than
others....political discourse has redefined issues of power and distribution as
questions of identity, morality, and patronage. This is what happened to
poverty, which slipped easily, unreflectively, into a language of family, race,
and culture rather than inequality, power, and exploitation."'16
However, shifting the focus of the political discourse on poverty from one of
individual failure to one of unequal relations is encumbered by how widely
and historically held the stereotypes about the individual nature of poverty are
and by the ways in which laws reinforce these conceptions. 17
As well as skewing the discourse on poverty generally, the stigmatizing of
poverty as a personal failure also gives rise to povertyism. One commentator
has suggested that "the imposition of stigma...is the commonest form of
violence used in democratic societies." 18 Part of the reason for this is that
stigma provides a justification for discrimination: once someone is somehow
proven to be inferior, that person is then perceived as deserving inferior
treatment.
It is not my intention to address the issue of the very incidence of poverty or
the unequal distribution of poverty. Tackling those issues is far beyond the
scope of this paper. I intend only to address the discrimination that occurs as a
result of an individual's condition of poverty.
2. Outsider Jurisprudence
It is my hope that this paper will contribute to the body of legal writing that has
been referred to as "outsider jurisprudence." The goal of such writing is to
broaden the scope of perspectives represented in litigation, legislation and
legal literature to include the perspective and experiences of outsiders. In the
context of a discussion of legal discourse, Kim Lane Scheppele has described
insiders and outsiders as falling on opposite sides of the we/they dichotomy:
"We" are those who consent [to existing laws]; "they" are outside the reach of
"our" laws..."We" are the forces of justice in the world who are on the right
side of this [given] case; "they" are the opponents who want to thwart "us" at
every tum..."We," the insiders, are those whose versions count as facts;
16. Ibid.
17. See discussion infra.
18. Spicker, supra, note 14 at 3.
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"they," the outsiders, are those whose versions are discredited and disbe-
lieved. This can happen on an individual level, where specific persons find
their truths not to be inevitable, or on a collective level, where whole groups
of persons find their truths to be dismissed." 19
I will emphasize throughout this paper that people in poverty are outsiders to
legal discourse. In a welfare state, people in poverty are in heightened contact
with law-making bodies and legal structures. That contact, however, is not as
a participant or as a citizen perceived of as an equal active member of a social
contract. Instead, people in poverty are subject to the expectations and
assumptions, the beliefs and values of the economically privileged in society.
The laws which affect them directly, which determine their relationship to the
state and society, which have the potential to alleviate some of the inequality
they experience are designed by the privileged according to the perceptions
and experiences of the privileged.
Mari Matsuda has described the mandate of outsider jurisprudence as adopting
a bottom-up perspective, focussing on the perspectives and experiences of the
people who are persistently subordinated to the bottom of various social
hierarchies.20She emphasizes that it is the hope of the writers of outsider
jurisprudence that their work will lead to "a just world free of existing condi-
tions of domination. '21 In order to accomplish such a goal, Matsuda argues,
outsiders must focus on effects:
"The need to attack effects of racism and patriarchy in order to attack the
deep, hidden, tangled roots characterizes outsider thinking about law."22
An effects approach in this paper will involve maintaining a perspective that
considers the effects of jurisprudence articulated by people in privilege on
people in poverty, on the lives of the victims of povertyism.
The difficulty I face in attempting to adopt this approach is that I am not
poor.Z However, I do understand the experience of being an outsider by
19. K. L. Scheppele, "Foreward: Telling Stories" (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review
2073 at 2079-2080.
20. M. Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Hate Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story" (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2329, at 2324.
21. bi. at 2325.
22. Ibid.
23. I am currently a student and I am self-sufficient by means of student loans and part-
time and summer employment. However, my family is middle class (my mother is
in a white collar position and my father holds a blue collar job) and I generally have
the option of their financial support if necessary. Furthermore, for most of my life, I
lived in a middle class environment. The only exception to this experience was
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virtue of being a woman and a lesbian. In offering this information, I am not
attempting to conflate the experiences of all outsiders nor to ignore the differ-
ences between them. Outsider jurisprudence focussing on people of colour has
broadened my awareness of the incongruence of some legal discourse and the
experience of these particular outsiders. Furthermore, it has articulated the
frustration that I have experienced as a lesbian and a woman. Overall, how-
ever, I do not claim to have a direct personal understanding of the perspectives
of people in poverty.
One of the ways in which some writers of outsider jurisprudence incorporate
and explore outsider experiences is through story. Richard Delgado has des-
cribed storytelling as a particularly "counterhegemonic" strategy for engaging
conscience:
"We believe that stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are potent
devices for analyzing mindset and ideology--the bundle of presuppositions,
received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which
legal discourse takes place...it is the prevailing mindset through which mem-
bers of the majority race justify the world as it is, that is with whites on top
and Blacks on the bottom. Ideology makes current social arrangements seem
neutral and fair."24
Following in this tradition, I began this paper with three stories which I will
refer to repeatedly as I progress through my paper. The experiences of the
people in these stories illustrate, more vividly than any abstract legal dis-
course, the outsider perspective I am attempting to explore.
3. The Law and Povertyism
3.1 Legal Construction and Discrimination
The earlier discussion on povertyism emphasized that the stereotypes and
stigma at the root of such discrimination are socially constructed. At the
helm of such constructions are the social and political institutions, such as
schools, churches, media, the market, government bureaucracies, legisla-
tures and the courts, that develop and maintain dominant ideologies.2 S The
earlier discussion also emphasized that stigma arises out of some perceived
differences. Because discrimination generally is so inextricably linked to
difference, the social mechanisms creating or naming difference are
when I was very young (pre-school) at which time our family income would have
been below the poverty line.
24. Richard Delgado, cited in Scheppele, supra, note 19 at 2075.
25. For a discussion of state ideologies and the role of ideological state apparatuses, see
Althussar, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), at 127-85.
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extremely instrumental in the development of discriminatory beliefs and prac-
tices. Law, a mechanism that persistently names and categorizes people and
activities, is therefore one such mechanism. This section will examine the role
of law in institutionalizing povertyism.
The poor in society have been subject to persistent legal naming and categoriz-
ing since at least the early thirteenth century in Canadian legislation's British
poor law roots. It is my submission that this history of being named and
renamed has reflected, perpetuated and legitimized stereotypes about people in
poverty that are widely held by society. Essentially, this legal history illustrates
the systemic nature of povertyism.
A crucial factor to be realized in this discussion is that the power of legal
naming has historically been vested in the privileged. The legislators who
identify and categorize people in poverty are not themselves poor. The effect
of this concentration of privilege is that the poor become objects to be manip-
ulated by legal language for whatever economic or social purposes underlie
the legislative scheme of the day. This objectification reinforces the sense of
difference and creates an us/them dichotomy, clearly demarcating the poor as
outsiders.
Naming is more than a process of identifying. It is a process of creating
hierarchies and creating differences between the various named groups.
Often, the motivation behind the naming, the rationale behind the categor-
ical scheme, is determined by the interests of the namers rather than any
inherent differences in the named. Therefore, when some form of an
us/them dichotomy is created, there is an implicit hierarchy wherein "us" is
privileged. 26
As the namers work from a point of privilege in their naming, they operate on
particular sets of assumptions and values. While the categories that they then
name into existence may in themselves appear neutral because of often clini-
cal/legal language, they are in fact charged with the sets of assumptions and
values of those who named them.27
The power of the legal process of naming is that once differences are "identi-
fied," they are perceived as fixed, natural entities. They are assumed to be
essential to the people named and the actual explanation for the cate-
gory/name. Furthermore, once a label or category is in place, once a difference
26. J. Culler, On Deconstruction (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1982).
27. D. Spender, "Extracts from Man Made Language" in D. Cameron, ed., The Feminist
Critique of Language (London: Routledge, 1990) at 102-9.
(1993) 9 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
is created, the label is imputed with value judgements that remain unstated but
everpresent. 28
The paradox in naming poverty is that, although legal categorization of the
poor emphasizes distinctions and thereby facilitates and legitimizes prejudice
and discrimination, the poor must be identified by law if legal mechanisms are
to attempt to alleviate poverty.29 In a welfare state, the poor will always be
subject to legal naming and categorization.
It is not my intention in this paper to advocate the elimination of the legal
naming of poverty and people in poverty. It is my submission, however,
that the assumptions underlying this classification must be scrutinized and
exposed. The purpose of this project is not to eliminate the naming but to
challenge the assumptions and values implicit in them. Furthermore, while
law is an instrumental mechanism in the creation of distinctions and classi-
fications of the poor, it may also work towards dismantling the assumptions
imputed to legal classifications of poor. Essentially, then, I am arguing that
while law obviously constructs difference, it must also deconstruct any
assumptions underlying those constructed differences in order to work
towards the implosion of the myths and stereotypes plaguing people in
poverty.
This section will, therefore, examine the legislated history of the poor in order
to illustrate the process of naming/creating difference suggested above and the
serious problems for the poor inherent in that naming. I will begin by consid-
ering the early Poor Laws in Britain and then turn to the history of Poor Laws
in Canada, particularly Ontario. I will also look briefly at some of the recent
directions the government has considered following in reforming laws related
to the poor. This section is not intended in any way to be a complete history of
said legislation and government action. My purpose is to examine the process
of the legal naming of the poor in order to expose the attitudes behind the laws
as well as the attitudes legitimized by them.
3.2 Methodology: History from the Bottom
It is not my intention to examine any purported economic justifications for the
creation of poor laws. To adopt such a perspective would be to adopt the
perspective or the justification of the law-makers. In effect, to adopt such a
28. M. Minnow, Making All The Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 52, 56-74.
29. This is essentially what Martha Minnow has called "the dilemma of difference";
Ibid. at 9, 20.
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perspective would be to approach a review of the legal construction of poverty
from the top.30
In discussing outsider jurisprudence, Mari Matsuda refers to a specific meth-
odology used by legal scholars to examine issues affecting people outside of
mainstream jurisprudence. She describes the methodology as
"consciously both historical and revisionist, attempting to know history from
the bottom...from the fear of namelessness of the slave, from the broken
treaties of the indigenous Americans..." 31
As I attempt to know history from the bottom, I will specifically focus on the
effects of this legislation on people in poverty, not in terms of how it alleviated
or worsened their impoverishment, but as it has legitimized prejudicial per-
spectives of the poor that contradict their felt experience and reality.
3.3 British Poor Laws
Early British legislation only began to name the poor in any way once they
became a threat to the propertied class. This legislation characterized the poor
as a homogeneous group, articulated stereotypes of the poor, eventually cre-
ated distinctions among the poor according to their moral culpability for their
low economic status, and ultimately embedded all of these assumptions in a
repressive system of laws and practices that affected the lives of the poor daily
and provided the foundations for the future treatment and regard of the poor in
legislation in both Britain and North America.
An important realization in this discussion is that although the laws throughout
this period gradually created distinctions between people who were poor, these
differences were not nearly as clear as the laws suggested. Essentially, the
experience of poverty is not easily categorized. The poor laws addressed
poverty from the perspectives of the privileged. The ease with which the
demarcations were created more accurately reflects the perceptions and bias of
the privileged than the reality of the experiences of the poor.
In examining this early legislation, I will highlight the prejudicial attitudes it
articulated and thereby legitimized.
30. Interestingly, one might seriously consider whether in fact one could examine the
legal construction of the poor from a top-down perspective since a top-down
approach would fail to expose underlying assumptions. Essentially, then, such an
approach would probably be incapable of recognizing the constructions as construc-
tions and would surely be incapable of separating those constructions from prejudi-
cial assumptions made about the (again-constructed) inherent nature of the poor.
31. Supra, note 20 at 2324.
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a. Stereotype: the poor are idle and thieving.
With the transformation of English society from feudalism to capitalism
came a transformation in the nature of economic insecurity for people in
poverty. The freedom from servitude to feudal lords also created a state
of freedom from the basic economic protection that patrons and lords
previously provided to those under their control. Therefore, when
struck by misfortune, some of the poor turned to begging or to theft for
survival.
The propertied class, confronted by a lack of labour control as well as a new
increase of a threat to the security of their property, pressed for some legisla-
tion to control the newly freed class of people of low economic status. By the
mid fourteenth century, famine and plague left the propertied class with
another threat: with so many deaths, the available labour supply fell dramati-
cally and labourers began demanding higher wages and more benefits. The
labourers were also willing to travel to find employers willing to meet their
demands.
The combination of these factors culminated in the Statute of Laborers in
1349, part of which stated as follows:
"Because that many valiant beggars, as long as they may live of begging, do
refuse to labor, giving themselves to idleness and vice, and sometime to theft
and other abominations; none upon the said pain of imprisonment, shall under
the color of pity or alms, give anything to such, which may labour, or presume
to favor them towards their desires, so that thereby they may be compelled to
labor for their necessary living." 32
The Statute clearly stereotypes all beggars and all unemployed persons. It also
imputes a degree of moral culpability for not having employment.
Another part of the proclamation essentially punishes unemployment with a
forced return to a state of servitude:
"That every man and woman of our realm of England, of what condition he
be, free or bond, and within the age of three-score years, not living in
merchandize, nor exercising any craft, nor having of his own whereof he may
live, nor proper land, about whose tillage he may himself occupy, and not
serving any other, if he in convenient service, his estate considered, be
required to serve, he shall be bounden to serve him which so shall him require;
and take only the wages, livery, meed, or salary, which were accustomed to be
given in the places where he oweth to serve..And is any such man or woman,
being so required to serve, will not the same do,...he shall anon be taken...and
32. K. de Schweinitz. England's Road to Social Security (London: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1943) at 1.
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committed to the next gaol, there to remain under strait keeping, till he find
surety to serve the form aforesaid. '
33
The earliest legislation dealing with the poor in the aftermath of the breakdown
of feudalism immediately attached a stigma to unemployment. It attached
assumptions about moral turpitude to both economic and employment status.
For people who were poor one of the effects of such stereotyping and stigma-
tization was that they became, in a sense, as enslaved as had previously been
the case in feudalism. Armed with these moral assumptions, the state was
justified in restricting the freedom, in controlling the actions of people of lov
economic status.
Another important aspect of this early legislation is the fact that it was
proclaimed in response to the needs of the propertied class, not the needs or
interests of the poor:
"...these monarchs were not moved by sentiments of piety or pity as they
resolutely addressed themselves to the problem of poverty, but they were at
the same time deeply persuaded that unrelieved and uncontrolled poverty was
the most fertile breeding ground for local disorders which might by a kind of
social contagion flame across the whole realm. Hence it was that the immense
power of the Crown was steadily addressed to the problem of poverty.'"34
It is not surprising, then, that the characterization of the poor in the Statute
would also further serve the interests of that privileged class. The propertied
were provided with a labour force with a legislated wage ceiling.
The provisions in the legislation which might be said to address the possibility
of alleviating poverty focus on forcing the poor into employment. The philos-
ophy appears to have been that by depriving them of any other source of
support, such as alms, and by punishing them when they even ask for such
support, the poor will be left with no alternative other than attaining employ-
ment. The presumption was that such employment existed and that all of the
poor were capable of working.
b. Stereotype: the poor are all the same and their poverty
arises from their refusal to work
In 1350, another piece of legislation was enacted as a companion to the Statute
of Laborers. The crux of this legislation was to restrict labourers from moving
33. Ibid. at 6.
34. W.K.Jordan, Philanthropy in England 1480-1660: A Study of the Changing Pattern
of English Social Aspirations (London: Ruskin House, 1959) at 75; see also P.
Slack, Poverty & Policy In Tudor & Stuart England (London: Longman House,
1988) at 115.
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with the seasons to take other work if there was already work available in the
town in which they resided. Therefore, not only was it somehow immoral to be
without work and to demand more wages than were being offered, it was also
somehow immoral or at least illegal to search for new or higher paying work
if one was already employed.
An important implication of all of these provisions having been enacted
together is the way in which the legislators perceived all of the problems as
interrelated:
"...the King and his lords saw begging, movement and vagrancy, and labor
shortage as essentially the same problem, to be dealt with in one law...the
beggar, in the concern of the Statute of Laborers, was not a problem in
destitution but a seepage from the supply of labour."35
Waxman has argued that the process of the stigmatization of poverty began
with two initial stages. First, the poor were identified as a group, as having a
"collective status" thrust upon them. Second, most of that group of poor
persons were then cast into a negative status group.36 The Statute of Laborers
essentially codified that negative status of the poor.
c. Stereotype: Some poor deserve relief because their poverty is
not their own fault; however most poor are undeserving and
constitute an immoral menace.
It was not until the very late fifteenth century that Parliament began to realize
that people might be poor because of circumstances rather than moral turpi-
tude. At this time, the laws began creating distinctions between poor, particu-
larly the poor found begging. In 1495, less punishment was dealt to pregnant
women and very sick people found begging.37 Similarly, in 1504, "persons
being impotent" and above 60 years old were treated more leniently than other
beggars.38 Implicit in the creation of these separate categories is a brief
realization that people might beg because they are in fact in need and unable to
support themselves.
Also in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, people were increasingly
separated from the land as tillaging was replaced by pasturing.39 Unable to
live off the land, more and more people became impoverished, in need of some
35. De Schweinitz, supra, note 32 at 6.
36. Waxman, supra, note 8 at 75.
37. De Schweinitz, supra, note 32 at 8.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. at 9.
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support for survival. The laws enacted to respond to this reality were similar to
their predecessors in that they, once again, depicted poverty as a vice, a sign of
personal and moral failure. These laws formed what is now referred to as the
"Poor Laws."
The initial statute in this series of laws was enacted in 1531. The preamble to
the statute maintains the stigmatizing of poverty and unemployment:
"In all places in England, vagabonds and beggars have of long time increased,
and daily do increase in great and excessive numbers, by the occasion of
idleness, mother and root of all vices, whereby hath insurged and sprung, and
daily insurgeth and springeth, continual thefts, murders, and other heinous
offenses and great enormities, to the high displeasure of God, the unquietation
and damage of the king's people, and to the marvellous disturbance of the
common weal of this realm..."
The preamble also noted the history of legislation before this statute which
sought "reformation of the premises" and lamented that despite these "sundry
good laws, strict statutes and ordinances," the presence of poor people had
persisted and, in fact, increased.41
The tone of this statute is similar to the previously discussed legislation in that
the poor are depicted as a menace to the King and England in the sight of God.
Clearly, a threat to the propertied class was tantamount to a threat to England
as a whole. Informing much of this legislation was the persistent notion or
stereotype that "hungry men were simply invincibly idle men, that poverty was
a consequence of moral fault."42
The poor were assumed to have a particular criminal element among them
when, in fact, the criminal problems arising out of vagrancy, though acute,
were also limited. 43 The legislation throughout this part of the century
appeared to assume that "poverty and vagrancy were synonymous." 44 Once
again, the motivation for this legislation was not the need of the poor as much
as the need to subdue the poor and stem their threatening presence. One of the
effects of the legislation would have been a further reinforcement of social
condemnation of the poor because of their loW economic status.
40. Ibid. at 20.
41. Ibid.
42. Jordan, supra, note 34 at 80.
43. Ibid. at 75.
44. Ibid at 80.
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Another similarity between this statute and other legislation was that it created
categories among the poor. In fact, it mandated an inquiry in each local area of
"all aged poor and impotent persons which live or of necessity be compelled
to live by alms of the charity of the people." 45 These persons would be
documented, assigned specific areas in which they would be permitted to beg,
and be provided with a letter indicating this authorization.46 Alms to "able-
bodied" (read "undeserving") poor were strictly prohibited. Any person found
providing such alms was subject to a fine. Any such able-bodied person found
begging would be tied naked to a cart in the marketplace, whipped, and forced
to return to his parish of origin.
d. Stereotype: the undeserving poor need to be reformed;
they need a strict lesson in discipline; their personal failure
justifies harsh treatment by the state.
The Statute of 1536 provided a codification of the provisions found in a
previous series of statutes. Like the above, it provided for harsh treatment of
able-bodied beggars. The first time such a person was found begging, he
would be sent to their home parish; the second time, he would be whipped and
the gristle of his right ear would be cut off; the third time, he would be
executed.
Again, distinctions were made among the poor. For example, children between
5 and 14 would be appointed to apprenticeship positions. Other non-able-bod-
ied poor people would be provided for by a systematic scheme for collecting
and distributing charity through the local churches. The other categorizations,
reminiscent of that of previous legislation, are indicated in the following
excerpt detailing who would be eligible for such relief:
"...the poor, impotent, lame, feeble, sick and diseased people, being unable to
work, may be provided, holpen, and relieved so that in no wise they nor none
of them be suffered to go openly in begging; and that such as be lusty or
having their limb strong enough to labor, may be daily kept in continual labor,
whereby every one of them may get their own sustenance and living with their
own hands." 47
This statute marks the beginning of a legislated scheme of organizing relief for
the "deserving" or blameless poor, the poor who could not apparently help
being poor.
45. de Schweinitz, supra, note 32 at 21.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid. at 23.
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However, the Poor Laws did not contemplate the possibility that there could be
people who were unemployed because there were no jobs for them. Instead,
the legislation assumed them to be part of the groups of vagrants that the laws
had focused on since they began to deal with poverty. By assuming that such
persons were vagrants, were "below the line of respectability," the legislation
failed to seriously contemplate the reason for the persistence of poverty and to
acknowledge the legitimate needs of the poor; instead, it attempted to deal
with poverty through essentially criminal measures.4
Sixteenth century legislation provided for a compulsory poor rate for relief of
the deserving poor and penal measures against vagrants, or vagabonds. One of
the distressing aspects of this law for poor people was the breadth of the
definition of "vagabond" which included minstrels, tinkers, and "loitering"
labourers. Legislation in 1572 provided that these vagabonds
"were to be whipped and bored through the ear by order of sessions for a first
offence, unless masters could be found who would take them on; and for a
second offence they would be hung as felons, unless taken into service for two
years."
4 9
Another innovation of the Poor Laws in this period was the appointment of
officers in each parish to oversee all categories of the poor led to another
stereotype.
e. Stereotype: the poor are almost presumptively financial risks;
they must be scrutinized; economically privileged people are
authorities on the character and likelihood of future success
of the poor.
The next major development in the Poor Laws occurred in 1662 with the
implementation of the Law of Settlement.50 This statute required that every
individual or family who moved into a new parish and rented a tenancy for less
than ten pounds a year be subject to the justices' scrutiny for the first forty
days. If the justices formed the opinion that the newcomers might at some time
in the future apply for relief, then the justices were required to return the
newcomers to their home parish.51
48. Jordan, supra, note 34 at 88.
49. Slack, supra, note 34 at 124.
50. 13 & 14 Charles II, c. 12, an Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom,
1662 [The Law of Settlement].
51. de Schweinitz, supra, note 32 at 40.
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The law mandated state scrutiny of people solely because of their low income
and empowered justices to form speculative personal opinions about the
character of poor newcomers with the presumption that many would burden
the parish. A further effect was to create greater restriction on the movement of
the poor than any other legislation before it. Not only did the statute place a
burden on the poor who were ultimately removed, but also it subjected every
poor newcomer to scrutiny. It also gave power to the landowners in the area
who could refuse to rent a tenancy to anyone for over ten pounds if they
wanted the person and her family to be watched and ultimately removed.
Although the law was actually criticised,52 it remained largely unchanged until
1795 when an amendment provided that the poor could only be removed once
they had applied for relief. 53
f Stereotype: the able-bodied poor are an untapped resource of
labour which could be exploited if reformed and trained.
By the late seventeenth century, the early characterization of the poor as a
threat gave way to a regard for them as an untapped resource. In this vein, the
labouring poor were identified as somewhat of another subgroup in the poor.
Although not perceived as "deserving," the working poor were no longer as
stridently associated with the "undeserving" vagrants of their group because
they appeared to be reformable. This group of poor people were finally
perceived as "a segment which should be neither punished, nor simply taken
for granted and held in charity, but manipulated." 54
The Poor Laws were subject to ardent criticisms by the late eighteenth century
because of some of the support they provided to the poor. Behind these
criticisms lay the same set of stereotypical assumptions about the poor high-
lighted above. In 1786, Joseph Townsend published an influential commen-
tary, entitled, A Dissertation on the Poor Laws: By a Well-Wisher to
Mankind.55 He generalized about all of the poor as though they were a
homogeneous group all suffering from the same vices and inherent moral
frailties.
Below, I will review several of Townsend's propositions at length for several
reasons. First, Townsend's short book was widely read at the time of its
52. Waxman, supra, note 8 at 79.
53. Ibid at 44.
54. Slack, supra, note 34 at 32.
55. J. Townsend, A Dissertation on the Poor Laws: By a Well-Wisher to Mankind(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), [hereinafter "Townsend"]; for-
ward by Ashley Montagu [hereinafter "Montagu"].
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publication and for a substantial period afterwards. 56 Second, his ideas mark
the origin of the theories of Malthus and, through Malthus, Darwin, who
would profoundly influence social and legal thinking in that century and
beyond.57 Third, shortly after the publication of his book, the Poor Laws were
changed in a way that would have been in direct opposition to Townsend's
position. However, Townsend's perspectives would directly influence the
reform of these laws for the next thirty years. 58 Fourth, Townsend's perspec-
tives fuelled criticism of the Poor Laws and articulated stereotypes about the
poor at a time when the same laws were under consideration in Upper Canada.
Finally, Townsend's arguments illustrate an overarching perspective of the
poor that encompasses all of the stereotypes highlighted above and they are
remarkably similar to the perspectives of some current social commentators.
Essentially, Townsend criticized the poor laws for rewarding the poor through
support even though they were naturally undeserving by the very fact of their
poverty:
"What have [the poor] to fear, when they are assured, that if by their indolence
and extravagance, by their drunkenness and vices, they should be reduced to
want, they shall be abundantly supplied not only with food and raiment, but
with their accustomed luxuries, at the expense of others."59
He blatantly stereotypes the poor, characterizing their economic status as a
direct indication of their personal morality. Furthermore, all of this commen-
tary on the poor is set up as a direct comparison between the poor and the
economically advantaged:
"The poor know little of the motives which stimulate the higher ranks to
action-pride, honour, and ambition. In general, it is only hunger which can
spur and goad them on to labour, yet our laws have said, they shall never
hunger...It is universally found, that where bread can be obtained without care
or labour, it leads through idleness and vice to poverty."'6 0
Townsend's perceptions of the poor as subordinated to the economically
advantaged, of poverty as a personal characteristic and of the need for legisla-
tion to treat the poor and poverty as such are stated most clearly below:
56. Montagu, ibid. at 1.
57. Waxman, supra, note 8 at 81.
58. Ibid.
59. Townsend, supra, note 55 at 23.
60. Ibid. at 23, 24.
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"A WISE legislator will endeavour to confirm the natural bonds of society,
give vigour to the first principles on which political union must depend. He
will preserve the distinctions which exists in nature independent of his author-
ity, and the various relations which, antecedent to his creation, connected man
to man. He will study the natural obligations which arise from these relations,
that he may strengthen these connections by the sanction of his laws. Among
the first of these relations stands the relation of a servant to his master...But
our laws tend to weaken these bonds by compelling the occupier of land to
find employment for the poor...'rhe wisest legislator will never be able to
devise a more equitable, a more effectual, or in any respect a more suitable
punishment, than hunger is for the disobedient servant. Hunger will tame the
fiercest animals, it will teach decency and civility, obedience and subjection,
to the most brutish, the most obstinate, and the most perverse...Drunkenness
is the common vice of poverty; not perhaps of poverty but of the uncultivated
mind...When, therefore, by the advance of wages [the common people] obtain
more than is sufficient for their bare subsistence, they spend the surplus at the
alehouse, and neglect their business..." 6 1
Finally, Townsend recognized that the subordination of the poor, the very
existence of poverty, directly benefits the privileged in society. Not surpris-
ingly, he perceived this as both a positive and a natural phenomenon:
It seems to be a law of nature, that the poor should be to a certain degree
improvident, that there may always be some to fulfil the most servile, the most
sordid, and the most ignoble offices in the community. The stock of human
happiness is thereby much increased, whilst the more delicate are not only
relieved from drudgery, and freed from those occasional employments that
would make them miserable, but are left at liberty, without interruption, to
pursue those callings which are suited to their various dispositions, and most
useful to the state. As for the lowest of the poor, by custom they are reconciled
to the meanest occupations, to the most laborious works, and to the most
hazardous pursuits; whilst the hope of their reward makes them cheerful in the
midst of all their dangers...when hunger is either felt or feared, the desire of
obtaining bread will quietly dispose the mind to undergo the greatest
hardships, and will sweeten the severest labours."62
Townsend then posited his alternative to the poor law: relief for the poor
should be "limited and precarious" in order to "promote industry and econ-
ory"63 and the poor tax should be gradually reduced to approximately a tenth
of what it was to force the labouring poor to "acquire habits of diligent
application, and of severe frugality."'64 He noted that the poor already lived in
their own societies and formed clubs amongst themselves and argued that they
61. Ibid. at 26-7, 30.
62. Ibid. at 35.
63. Ibid. at 62.
64. Ibid. at 63.
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should be required to pay up to a third of their wages into these clubs to
provide common support for each other. Such a system, in his mind, would
have the following effect:
"Thus would sobriety, industry, and economy, take place of drunkenness,
idleness, and prodigality, and due subordination would be again restored." 65
Clearly, people were personally responsible for their poverty and, as such,
should be personally responsible for its alleviation.
3.4 Poor Laws in Upper Canada
At the time that the poor laws were under such heavy criticism in England,
Upper Canada was establishing itself as a new province. The first significant
legislative treatment of the poor in Upper Canada was to make the poor
invisible in the law by explicitly rejecting the British poor laws. In 1792, the
first statute adopted by the legislature essentially transplanted the bulk of
British civil law to Upper Canada. However, that statute, in its final clause,
specifically provided that "nothing in this Act...shall...introduce any of the
laws in England respecting the maintenance of the poor."66 While the British
poor laws were wrought with shortcomings and oppressive assumptions,
their existence at least recognized the need for a legislated system of social
assistance.
Significantly, the legislators rejecting the poor laws consisted of several loyal-
ists who specifically came to Upper Canada after the American Revolution
seeking an environment steeped in British legal and political tradition. Another
significant factor is that New Brunswick and Nova Scotia had both replicated
the British poor laws by 1786. Several historians have postulated theories as to
this omission and the question appears to remain unresolved. There is no
current consensus as to why Upper Canada diverged from these precedents. 67
Some historians have suggested that the decision to abandon the poor laws was
an administrative, pragmatic decision given the new and shifting set-up of the
colony as compared to Britain. Furthermore, the tax base available in Britain
was not to be found in Upper Canada. Finally, the governments in Nova Scotia
65. Ibid. at 64.
66. Upper Canada, Statutes, 1792, c.1, cited in R. Splane. Social Welfare in Ontario
1791-1893: A Study of Public Welfare Administration (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1965) at 65.
67. Russell Smandych reviews the various theories in his work: Upper Canadian con-
siderations about rejecting the English poor law, 1817-1837: a comparative study of
the reception of law, (Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; [unpublished] at
10-16.
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and New Brunswick were having difficulties administering their transplanted
system of poor laws.68 One difficulty with this theory is that it does not
explain why the decision was made so explicitly.69
Other historians have argued that the decision not to include a system of poor
laws arose out of the frontier ideology of the new province, stressing rugged
individualism and Darwinian notions of economic survival. Essentially, this
argument suggests that the rejection of the poor laws reflected the belief that
Upper Canada was
"...a vigorously self-reliant society founded upon individual initiative exploit-
ing almost unlimited resources. The fittest would survive; the temporarily
distressed would be looked after by family or by locally organized private
charity; those who could not "make a go of it" would perish or move on; and
government would play a minimal role.",70
Such an attitude clearly casts economic disadvantage as an individual short-
coming. Absent a clear reason for poverty such as illness or age, one's inability
to prosper in the new country amounted to a personal failure, an indication of
a lack of fitness.
Russell Smandych has recently added to the latter argument. Reflecting on the
Tory histories of the main statesmen of Upper Canada at the time of its
inception, Smandych argues that their staunch Tory beliefs motivated their
decision to reject the English poor laws.71He emphasizes that these men would
have been well aware of the debates in England and would actually have been
in England when the animosity was building. Smandych notes that the deci-
sions of 1791 were made by a wealthy elite. He compares the sentiments of
Upper Canada to those of the old province of Quebec where wealthy English
merchants and French landowners apparently supported the Governor of Que-
bec in his efforts to prevent the direct importation of British civil law72 and,
more particularly, laws aimed at various kinds of public relief.73
The decision not to adopt the poor laws of England in Upper Canada, whether
administrative or ideological, was made by a wealthy elite with a tradition of
disdain for the notion of public relief. Implicitly, it legitimizes the notion that
68. The main proponent of this argument is Richard Splane.
69. See Smandych, supra, note 69.
70. J.C. Levy, cited in Smandych, ibid. at 13.
71. Ibid. at 17.
72. Ibid. at 20.
73. Ibid. at 22.
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poverty is a personal, not a public phenomenon. With no real public support
available, the poor relied on what few private sources existed, such as family
and private philanthropy.74 The distribution of private charity focussed, once
again, on the "deserving" poor.75
Despite the fact that the laws of Upper Canada did not recognize the problem
of poverty and the existence of the misconception that it would disappear if the
poor were not pandered to, poverty persisted. In the early 1820s, public
meetings were held to consider the creation of a system of public support
because the voluntarism was inadequate to meet the needs of the poor. Local
newspaper editorials reflected the assumptions and beliefs that Townsend had
articulated in Britain in response to the early poor laws: public relief was "a
premium for idleness." 76 The same reaction was heard in the 1850s as the
Toronto Globe persistently condemned suggestions for a public relief system,
arguing that "it contradicted sound economic theory and moral values of work
and industry."77
The early British stereotypes of the able-bodied poor as distinct from the
deserving poor and in need of personal correction were again legitimized in
some of the first Upper Canadian legislation attempting to address people
in poverty with the House of Industry Act of 1837. It provided for the
creation of houses which would administer indoor relief by "serv[ing] as
both 'houses of correction' for the 'idle and disorderly' poor, and as places
of 'refuge' and 'charity' for those who were considered to be more
deserving. '78 The principle of "less eligibility" was adopted from England in
74. D. Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 2nd ed. (Vancouver. Uni-
versity of British Columbia Press, 1988) at 12.
75. Ibid. at 14,24.
76. Ibid. at 25.
77. Houston, cited in Allan Irving, "From No Poor Law to the Social Assistance
Review: A History of Social Assistance in Ontario, 1791-1987" (July 1987)
[Unpublished] at 6.
78. Smandych, supra, note 67 at 34. The Act authorized justices to commit to the
Houses the following people:
(1) poor and indigent persons incapable of supporting themselves:
(2) all persons able of body to work and without means of maintaining themselves,
refusing or neglecting to do so; (3) all persons living a lewd, dissolute, vagrant life,
or exercising no ordinary calling of lawful business sufficient to gain or procure a
lawful living; (4) all such as spend their time and property in public houses to the
neglect of their lawful calling.
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the context of these workhouses. 79 This principle provided that people depen-
dent on assistance must be kept at a standard of living markedly lower than the
lowest paid labourer, which was assumed to be subsistence-level with the
result that relief was frequently insufficient to meet the needs of the poor.80 An
extension of this principle adopted from England was the "workhouse test:"
"People who refused to accept this form of help were considered to have
fraudulently asked for assistance. Those who accepted it were clearly those in
most desperate need and therefor the proper subjects of charity." 81
Once inside the workhouse, there was essentially a "work" test: people would
be required to perform often extremely heavy labour and those who did not
perform as required were perceived as fraudulent claimers. 82
This administration of indoor relief once again emphasized the presumption
that many poor persons seeking relief were doing so by choice and, as such,
were undeserving. The system also invited scrutiny of the poor in terms of
their willingness to comply with the strenuous demands upon which relief was
conditional. Furthermore, the fact that relief was in kind rather than in funds
reinforces the stereotype of the poor as irresponsible spendthrifts, unable to
budget their own affairs.
Overall, in the early history of Upper Canada, the initial lack of legislated
support for the poor and the later legislated Houses of Industry essentially
legitimated the same stereotypes about the poor and poverty discussed in the
previous section: poverty was cast as a personal problem; relief was a private
matter;83 the poor were divided as deserving and undeserving; the able-bodied
were presumed morally inferior and in need of reform. 84
University of Chicago Press, 1930) at 27.
79. Guest, supra, note 74 at 36.
80. The lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head, who was the
Assistant Poor Law Commissioner in Kent, England before he came to Upper Can-
ada articulated this policy while in England: his ways of implementing the policy
included ensuring that the conditions of workhouses were deplorable, refusing food
to anyone not working, and separating husbands and wives. Irving, supra, note 77 at 6.
81. Guest, supra, note 74 at 37.
82. Ibid.; see also Irving, supra, note 77 at 13.
83. The Municipal Institutions Act of 1866, with its 1867-8 amendments, and the Char-
ityAidAct of 1874 might be considered minor exceptions to this generalization: the
former allowed municipalities to care for the poor without actually mandating them
to do so while the latter established some provincial funding for private charities.
See Splane, supra, note 66 at 72-3, 80; Irving, supra, note 77 at 12.
84. For an outline of the general developments and persistent themes in the treatment of
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3.5 The Twentieth Century: An Emerging Social Welfare System
Any mechanisms in place in the nineteenth century to respond to the needs of
the poor, such as the Houses of Industry or soup kitchens and hostels run by
charitable organizations, provided relief to the poor in kind rather than in direct
funds. In the twentieth century, the Canadian and Ontario governments began
to recognize that a state response to poverty was necessary.
Part of this recognition might be attributed to the fact that the advance of
industrialization in Canada in the 1900s did not eliminate unemployment as
might have been expected. The realization that the root of unemployment
might not be located solely in the personal shortcomings of individuals began
to form. 85 With the recession of 1914-15, the government began to study
unemployment in an effort to determine what else could be the cause and how
it might be rectified.8 6
The state relief developed and considered in the twentieth was divided accord-
ing to subgroups of the poor such that the groups provided with allowances
were largely the groups that had been traditionally recognized as the deserving
poor such as persons with disabilities and senior citizens. After World War I, a
few of the deserving poor became the focus of attention:
"As a result of the large number of psychiatric casualties in the armed forces,
for example, interest in mental health and the care of the mentally ill received
a new impetus, as did the care and treatmentof blindness. The high percentage
of Canadians found unfit for military duty, coupled with the death of over
sixty thousand young Canadians in France, helped promote a greater interest
in health matters generally and in child welfare in particular."'87
Furthermore, for some groups, public relief was often characterized as a kind
of reward for hard work in the past.88 Examples of such legislation is the
Workmen's Compensation Act, Old Age Pensions Act, Mothers'Allowances
Act,89 and the War Veterans'Allowance Act.
the poor during this period, see Irving, supra, note 77 at 7-8.
85. See Guest, supra, note 74 at 70:
"Unemployment 'ceased to be a novelty'...this view clashed with the older notion,
more appropriate to a rural, pre-industrial Canada, that unemployment was evidence
of an unwillingness to work."
86. Ibid at 70-3.
87. Ibid. at 69.
88. Consider for example Mother's Allowance, a reward for assuming the responsibility
of the state's future citizens. Transitions, supra, note 13 at 73.
89. Ontario Statutes, 1920. Within this act, mothers were divided into further sub-
categories which also reflected a "deserving" status. Mothers eligible for the allow-
(1993) 9 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
The Great Depression in the 1930s posed a particularly compelling challenge
to historical stereotypes about the personal responsibility of the unemployed
for their poverty. The Ontario Unemployment ReliefAct of 1935 was one of
the earliest pieces of legislation recognizing the unemployed able-bodied
people as "deserving" poor.90 The province's program consisted of provincial
and municipal relief works as well as municipal relief. The unemployed were
required to work for relief by building highways, roads, and municipal build-
ings, sewers, street grading, and water mains; however, the relief was often
insufficient to support the relief-workers' families, suggesting the persis-
tence of the "less eligibility" philosophy.91 Furthermore, there was not
enough work to employ all of the unemployed and when they were laid off
from the relief works, the municipal relief available was only in-kind
relief.92
In the 1940s, the federal government established two particularly significant
pieces of welfare legislation: the Unemployment Insurance Act93 and the
Family Allowances Act.9 4 The first legislated a form of social security that
provided benefits at a wage-related rate which suggested that, like early social
allowance legislation, it was based on a reward system: the more productive
worker receives the greater benefit. The benefits were also provided as of
right, unlike previous benefits. This aspect of the legislation established "one
of the more enduring myths of the welfare state...that benefits as of right are
inseparably linked to contributions." 95 The programme also reflected a con-
cem about complacency: it maintained work incentives by restricting benefit
scales to the point that they failed to provide a "living wage" standard.96
The Family Allowances Act, the first universal welfare payment programme,
was designed with the particular strategy of ensuring the well-being of
ance included widows and mothers who were married to men in asylums or men
with permanent disabilities; the claimants also had to be British subjects have in
their care at least two children under the age of fourteen. The Act was extended in
1921 to include deserted wives and foster mothers as well. The obvious omission in
the legislation was mothers married to unemployed able-bodied men.
90. Transitions, supra, note 13 at 74.
91. Irving, supra, note 77 at 20.
92. Ibid at 21.
93. Canada Statutes, 1940.
94. Canada Statutes, 1944.
95. Guest, supra, note 74 at 105.
96. Ibid at 108.
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Canadian children. This focus on children, a "deserving" group in Canada,
would persist and actually characterizes much of the current federal commit-
ments to alleviating poverty.
The reforms to social welfare legislation in the 1950s, providing for shared-
cost conditional grant programs, proceeded largely on the same categorical
basis initiated in the early 1900s: the Old Age Assistance Act,9 7 the Blind
Persons Act,98 and the Disabled Persons Act.99 In the same period, another
shared cost program was initiated through the Unemployment Assistance Act
which expanded the category of deserving unemployed persons to included
divorced women and unwed mothers.1 0
The final major pieces of legislation constructing Ontario's social security net
were the General Welfare Assistance Act101 and the Family Benefits Act.102
The first was intended as another form of residual relief, to be administered in
response to "temporary distress and short-term need." 103 It added nothing to
the level of relief provided to people who were able-bodied and unem-
ployed104 and, in fact, provided for close scrutiny of people who were unem-
ployed but employables by welfare administrators who possessed the
discretion to terminiate assistance. The Family Benefits Act provided higher
rates of assistance to persons once again perceived as "deserving:" blind
people, people with disabilities, elderly people and sole-support mothers.105
The persistent theme in the emergence of the social welfare system in Canada
generally and Ontario specifically is that social assistance is only available on
a permanent basis to the "deserving" poor. Whatever assistance is available to
the unemployed able-bodied poor must remain at a level low enough to
provide an incentive to retain employment. That level will often fail to meet
basic needs as will some of the funding available to the "deserving" poor.
Therefore, the principle of "less eligibility" persists. The assumption implicit
97. 1951.
98. 1951.
99. 1954.
100. Transitions, supra, note 13 at 75.
101. Ontario Statutes, 1958.
102. Ontario Statutes, 1967.
103. Irving, supra, note 77 at 26.
104. Transitions, supra, note 13 at 75.
105. Ibid. at 76.
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in the maintenance of this principle is that there is employment available for
the unemployed poor who are sufficiently motivated to find it. A further
assumption is that employment will eradicate the poverty of the able-bodied
poor. Such an assumption ignores the reality of the poverty of the working
poor in Canada: in 1988, approximately 50% of low-income Canadian fami-
lies were headed by full-time workers. 106
Essentially the legal responses to poverty in Ontario and Canada have been
shaped by the values and assumptions of the law-makers. The experience of
the outsiders, the poor, particularly the able-bodied poor, is not acknowledged
by the legislation. Instead, the legislation perpetuates myths about unemploy-
ment and employment that maintain Canada's capitalist political economy and
support the high level of wealth of the privileged.
3.6 Current/Recent Government Action
Every discussion of reforming current legislation and attempting to alleviate
poverty either addresses or assumes the stereotypes and assumptions empha-
sized throughout this section. Below, I will highlight some very recent exam-
ples of the persistence of these assumptions. This is by no means an exhaustive
account of current legislative and governmental examples of creating and
reinforcing stereotypes, of legitimizing prejudice and stigma.
3.6.1 Unemployment Insurance
Recent amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act107 provide that any
person fired from a job because of misconduct or any person who quits his/her
position is ineligible for collecting unemployment insurance. The rationale
behind these provisions is reminiscent of the historical treatment of persons
who were unemployed. If a person's unemployment is perceived to be the fault
of that person, then he is "undeserving" of any form of public support or is
deserving of only a lesser form of support. The potential effect of the new
legislation will be to coerce people to remain employed in positions even if
they are subjected to harassment or unacceptable conditions because of the
fear of lack of financial support if they leave. This provision is tantamount to
a punishment and reinforces the stereotyping of all unemployed persons as
presumptively personally culpable without a consideration of individual cir-
cumstances.
The amendments also create the perception that any existing difficulties with
the unemployment insurance system are subsumed in the alleged "misuse" of
106. National Council of Welfare, "Fighting Child Poverty" (April 1990) at 27-32.
107. Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. V-1.
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the system. In the hearings before the Parliamentary Committee considering
the amendments, a union presented evidence to the committee that the inci-
dence of misuse is actually quite low. In fact, the group compared the inci-
dence rate to the rate of fraud convictions of Conservative Members of
Parliament. The presentation essentially challenges the whole assumption that
misuse is rampant. The Committee reacted by requiring the group to leave and
by striking their presentation from the record.108
Another example of this concentration on the alleged "misuse" of the system
rather than substantial reform of the system was the recent reaction of the
Federal Employment Minister, Valcourt, to the suggestion of establishing a
free telephone line to encourage people to report allegations of fraudulent
claims of unemployment insurance. The Minister acknowledged that his office
was considering this idea and that he could see no reason why not to consider
it.109 This idea reflects a presumptive lack of trust on the part of legislators
with respect to persons in receipt of public assistance. This lack of trust arises
out of the historical set of stereotypical beliefs about people of low economic
status generally and about unemployed persons particularly. The assumptions
underlying the government's concern is that there are an inordinate number of
undeserving people collecting unemployment insurance.
3.6.2 Where to Draw the Poverty Line
Another example of recent government action illustrating the persistence of
the historical stereotypes of people in poverty is the debate of the Sub-Com-
mittee on poverty over how to define "poverty." This debate was sparked by
some of the Progressive Conservative back-benchers on the Committee. The
very existence of the debate fails to answer crucial questions: who is partici-
pating in the debate over the definition, how will the various definitions affect
the poor, will the definition reflect the experience of outsiders; and is this a
proxy for reiterating the divisions between the deserving and undeserving
poor?
108. Discussion with Consuelo Rubio, Clinical Legal Worker, Centre For Spanish
Speaking People, who was a part of the group presenting the National Action
Committee's (NAC) position on the legislation. March 15, 1993. Note also that Judy
Rebick of NAC presented on a subsequent day and before beginning her submis-
sions, she stated for the record her disapproval of the actions of the Committee and
she also read into the record some of the information that the group had originally
presented.
109. Graham Fraser, "Valcourt applauds idea of UI Fraud Phone Line" The (Toronto)
Globe and Mail (11 February 1993). The Minister indicated the next day that "there
will be no 1-800 snitch line." See "Snitch Line Goes Dead" The (Toronto) Globe
andMail (12 February 1993)
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The latter question might be answered by the Globe and Mail's report of the
debate:
"The campaign to redefine poverty is another manifestation of a growing
debate over the question of who is truly poor in Canada."110
Not surprisingly, "redefining the poverty line" in this context means lowering
the line such that more people will be excluded from the category of the "truly
poor." The implication is that there are people now who would consider
themselves poor or who would be considered poor who do not deserve the
classification.
The chairperson of the parliamentary subcommittee, Barbara Greene, was one
of the main Members of Parliament encouraging the debate. Her rationale for
focusing on the definition is that "with the current measures, it's impossible to
eliminate poverty." This argument would suggest, then, that changing the
definition of poverty is one way to actually eliminate part of it. Ironically, the
Conservative argument suggested an understanding of poverty as a social
construction: poverty is what society or the legislature defines it as being.
A bottom-up reaction to this recognition of the social constructedness of
poverty would focus on the fact that so much of this construction has moral
undertones. It would concentrate on the effects of that construction on people
in poverty. The perspective of Greene and her government supporters, how-
ever, is top-down. To look at poverty from the top-down is not even to see
those who are poor. From the perspective of the privileged, poverty is a social
problem and privileged money is needed to eliminate it. Therefore, the main
focus from the top is cost. If the government can construct poverty into a
smaller problem, it will presumably cost less to eliminate it. The problem will
become more "manageable."
Obviously, the difficulty with this perspective is that poverty becomes face-
less. It becomes a set of numbers and questions about quality of life, freedom,
and equality are factored out of the whole issue.111 As argued by Patrick
Johnston, the Executive Director of the Canadian Council on Social Develop-
ment, finding a new measure of poverty is not going to make any difference to
people living below what is currently considered the poverty line. Johnston
emphasizes that there is already a clear indication that there is a depth of
110. Geoffrey York, "MPs try to move the poverty line" The (Toronto) Globe & Mail
(24 February 1993) Al, A2.
111. This seemed to be the fear and frustration of Chris Axworthy who "stormed out" of
the subcommittee meeting saying "you care about the numbers, I care about the peo-
ple." See York, ibid. at A2.
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poverty for people living with incomes below the Statistic Canada's Low
Income Cut-Off Lines and above the basic needs line that Greene would
advocate.
This debate over who is really poor and the pitting of a "basic needs line"
resembles what Nancy Fraser has termed the "politics of need interpreta-
tion."' 112 Fraser questions the assumptions behind interpretations of needs that
are posited as unproblematic and notes that when dominant social groups
interpret needs, those interpretations often reinforce the dominance of those
groups.113 One might question whether the debate over poverty lines is not
really the same debate using a different alias.
Essentially, the debate between Johnston and Greene, and their respective
supporters, is one of approach and the approaches being debated are bottom-up
and top-down.For persons in poverty, the debate over where the poverty line
should fall has serious implications for their voice and identity. Essentially, the
government, economists, social activists, and academics will engage in a
debate over how to define them. 114 This process involves an objectification of
people and it reinforces relative positions of power. As Dale Spender has
argued, only the privileged have the power to name and to define things into
existence. 115 Without power, there is no voice. The debate in the sub-commit-
tee on poverty, in setting its agenda as seeking for a new measure of poverty,
is an exercise of power. Their consultation is a further exercise of power as
people who are not poor define who is poor.
Furthermore, focussing on the definition of poverty diverts public attention
and resources away from more substantive issues such as eliminating poverty,
112. N. Fraser, "Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies" (1989) Ethics
291 at 291.
113. Ibid. at292-3.
114. This process is somewhat analogous to the government's presumption of defining
who was and who was not native by way of the Indian Act. See K. Jamieson. Indian
Women and the Law in Canada: Citizens Minus (Ottawa: Advisory Council on the
Status of Women and Indian Rights for Indian Women, April 1978).
115. Spender, supra, note 27 at 106:
"Given that language is such an influential force in shaping our world, it is obvious
that those who have the power to make the symbols and their meanings are in a
privileged and highly advantageous position. They have, at least, the potential to
order the world to suit their own ends, the potential to construct a language, a real-
ity, a body of knowledge in which they are the central figures, the potential to legiti-
mate their own primacy, and to create a system of beliefs which is beyond challenge
(so that their superiority is 'natural' and 'objectively' tested)."
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securing adequate minimum standards of living, or discrimination against
people in poverty.
4. The Ontario Human Rights Code Route
4.1 Conducive Aspects of the Ontario Human Rights Code
The underlying philosophy of the Ontario Human Rights Code, stated its
preamble, suggests that the it is an ideal mechanism for responding to the
pervasiveness of povertyism:
"WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalien-
able rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world and is in accord with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations;
AND WHEREAS it is public policy in Ontario to recognize the dignity and
worth of every person and to provide for equal rights and opportunities
without discrimination that is contrary to law, and having as its aim the
creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity
and worth of each person so that each person feels a part of the community
and able to contribute fully to the development and well-being and the
Province;"116
The discussion in the preceding section illustrated that there is clearly a lack of
respect for the dignity and worth of people in poverty because of their poverty.
Furthermore, for people in poverty, there appears to be a[ climate of stereo-
typing, not understanding. A climate of understanding would involve a com-
mon understanding of poverty as a social construction, not a widely-held
assumption that poverty is an indisputable indication of personal and moral
culpability.
The discussion in the previous section also illustrated that the stigma and
stereotypes about the poor have enjoyed several hundred years of institutional
legitimation. Povertyism permeates our legal structures, it is part of our culture
of capitalism, it is a hegemonic ideology.
The systemic nature of povertyism requires a systemic remedy. Just as
legislatures have legitimized and thereby perpetuated, if not created, stereo-
types about people in poverty, so can legislatures begin to dispel such stereo-
types. It is my submission that the Ontario Human Rights Code has the
potential to undertake a systemic, approach to the alleviation and eradication of
povertyism. A systemic approach would involve challenging stereotypes about
people in poverty at every social level: poverty must be understood to be a
116. Supra, note 4, Preamble [Emphasis added].
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product of our political economy, a social construction rather than a personal
failure.
The Ontario Human Rights Code, with the Human Rights Commission, could
be a viable, vital avenue for this approach. Despite existing problems with the
Commission, the Code has the ability to challenge the attitudes of more than
just governments. In particular, the protected areas of services, goods, facili-
ties, accommodation, and employment suggest a wide array of social relations
that may be subject to investigation and challenge when discrimination is
alleged.
One extremely attractive aspect of the Ontario Human Rights Code for fight-
ing povertyism is the remedial potential of the Boards of Inquiry. Bruce Porter,
Director of the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA), has
speculated that part of the reluctance on the part of courts in equality litigation
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to recognize povertyism
is that they are afraid of the magnitude of the remedies involved and often,
when the remedy would involve changes to legislation, the courts couch that
reluctance in terms of deference to Parliament. 117
The remedies available via the Ontario Human Rights Code are potentially far
more creative that those available through Charter litigation. Where a Board
of Inquiry finds that a party has contravened section 8 of the Code by infring-
ing the various rights outlined in Part I, section 40(l)(a) empowers the board
to, by order,
"direct the party to do anything that, in the opinion of the board, the party
ought to do to achieve compliance with this Act, both in respect of the
complaint and in respect of future practices."
The wording of the section suggests that the scope of this power rests on the
imagination of the board, counsel and the parties involved. As Judith Keene
notes, "it would be difficult to conceive of an award power more broadly
drafted than that."118
Several boards of inquiry have made orders requiring extensive staff retraining
in awareness and understanding of issues surrounding the protected ground
found to have been discriminated against as well as orders which have stipu-
117. Candian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter).
Interview with the author (2 December 1992), Centre for Equality Rights in Accom-
modation.
118. J. Keene, Human Rights in Ontario. 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 367.
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lated ongoing monitoring of the practices of the parties contravening s.8.119
As Chief Justice Dickson (as he then was) emphasized in Action Travail des
Femmes v. Canadian National Railway Co., "there simply cannot be a radical
disassociation of remedy and prevention. Indeed there is no prevention with-
out some sort of remedy." 120
The link between training or educating as a remedial order and the prevention
of povertyism is vital. As a case in point, consider the Street Health story at the
beginning of the paper. If one of the people in the survey, or perhaps even
Street Health itself, could bring a claim against a particular clinic or hospital
alleging discrimination on the basis of poverty in the delivery of health
services, it might be possible to alleviate the problems described in the story to
some degree. If such an investigation found that discrimination had occurred
or, perhaps, the duty to accommodate had not been fulfilled, staff training on
poverty issues and the particular health needs of people in poverty might
successfully dispel stereotypes and alter attitudes. Eventually, such action
might result in substantive improvements in access to health services for
people in poverty.
Similarly, Jane Doe's experience at the student awards office would suggest
discriminatory treatment of her by the awards officer because of factors such
as her income, race, age, and family and marital status that distinguish her from
the "normal" undergraduates at an university. If such attitudes in the awards office
were proved to have a disparate impact on people sharing common character-
istics with Jane amounting to discrimination, staff might be given awareness
training with respect to the differences that they discriminate against.
The Cornish Report also considered the issue of remedies and emphasized the
need for "proactive measures to remove group disadvantages and thus deal
with underlying discrimination rather than focusing only on individual com-
pensation." 121 This is commensurate with the goal of the preceding scenario
119. See for example, Hendry v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) (1980), 1 C.H.R.R.
D/160 (Ont Bd. of Inquiry); the Board ordered the design of a program to address
sex discrimination and required that the party report back on its progress; Dhillon v.
F.W. Woolworth Company (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/743 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry); the
Board ordered the creation of a race relations committee with various specific objec-
tives as a well as monitoring; Booker v. Floriri Village Investments Inc. (1989), 11
C.H.R.R. D/44 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) The Board ordered a landlord to change his
rental application and also required future monitoring.
120. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 212 (S.C.C.).
121. Ontario, Report of Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force: Achieving
Equality: A Report on Human Rights Reform (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 26 June
1992) at 144 (Chair: Mary Cornish) [hereinafter "Cornish"].
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and many situations of povertyism. As John Clarke of the Ontario Coalition
Against Poverty has indicated, issues like the above do not fit naturally into an
individual rights notion of adjudication: when the issue relates to poverty, "it's
an issue for the whole impoverished community."1z2 Therefore, the
implementation of the Cornish Report's recommendations relating to a shift in
focus to addressing group-oriented discrimination 123 would bolster the poten-
tial of the Commission to alleviate povertyism.
The Commission is capable of pursuing a proactive role in the community
beyond the context of remedies. An education campaign addressing issues of
povertyism could initiate dialogue in the community and might begin the
necessary process of challenging the assumptions about people in poverty that
many people may have even without realizing. As suggested earlier, poverty-
ism, unlike many other forms of discrimination, exists uncensured in popular
and political discourse.
While the potential use of the Ontario Human Rights Code in terms of
challenging povertyism and possibly changing attitudes in a broad, systemic
way is extremely important, it may or may not be the most important possible
outcome of this use of the Code for some people in poverty. Far more pragmati-
cally and immediately, the addition of "poverty" to the Ontario Human Rights
Code would provide a mechanism for securing access to housing, services and
facilities that might be crucial to the survival of people in poverty.
For example, currently, CERA will currently intervene immediately on a
behalf of a client who has been denied housing on a discriminatory basis and
secure the rental space before it is rented to someone else.124 Therefore, if the
Human Rights Code protected against discrimination on the basis of poverty,
someone like Dawn Kearney could contact CERA as soon as she is denied
housing. CERA could then contact the landlord to apprise them of the provis-
ions in the Code. Such information might be sufficient to secure housing for
Dawn. In the context of "receipt of public assistance," CERAfound that many
landlords were unaware that they could not legally refuse accommodation on
this basis. Merely informing discriminating landlords of the section has
secured accommodation for many CERA clients.125
122. J. Clarke, supra, note 5.
123. Cornish, supra, note 120 at 146-147.
124. Bruce Porter, supra note 116.
125. Ibid.
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In another example, Jane might be able to turn to the Ontario Human Rights
Code because of the telephone company's refusal to provide their services to
her. The issue in such a case would likely focus on whether the $100 is, in fact,
a bona fide requirement for use of the service or not. If, for example, the
company was capable of providing phone services without the options of long
distance calls and Jane could make the monthly payments for such service, the
company could potentially be required to allow that option rather than prevent
people in poverty, like Jane, from having phone service. Such an argument
would likely be particularly successful if there is only one phone company in
the province and phone service was shown to be an essential service in today's
society.
4.2 Potential Problems with the Human Rights Code Route:
the Rights Critique
My undertaking in this paper is, in the words of Bartholomew and Hunt, to
argue for a "rights-claim," to aspire "to convert a moral right [rights-talk
within moral discourse] into a legal...right."' 126 It is to aspire to expand the
Ontario Human Rights Code to include "poverty" as a grounds of discrimina-
tion such that people in poverty may claim a legal right not to be discriminated
against on the basis of that poverty. Such an undertaking necessarily calls into
play the "rights debate," part of which might be invoked against my argument.
I shall here contemplate various arguments in that debate briefly.127
4.2.1The Debate
Several critical legal studies ("CLS") scholars have questioned the use of
rights strategies in effecting social change. Such critiques have actually sug-
gested that the liberal theory of rights reinforces the culture of capitalism, or at
least the state's control over the individual. The main arguments criticizing the
effectiveness of and reliance on rights are stated briefly below:
"(1) Once one identifies what counts as a right in a specific setting, it
invariably turns out that the right is unstable; significant but relatively small
changes in the social setting can make it difficult to sustain the claim that a
right remains implicated. (2) The claim that a right is implicated in some
settings produces no determinate consequences. (3) The concept of rights
falsely converts into an empty abstraction (reifes) real experiences that we
126. Bartholomew & Hunt, "What's Wrong With Rights?" (1990) 9 Law and Inequality
1 at 7. See also Hunt, infra note 144, at 321: "Rights-claims are interests interpel-
lated into the normative language of rights which embody some claim to legitima-
tion by analogy or extension from other rights."
127. For a more detailed account of the debate, see Hunt and Bartholomew, supra note
125; see also Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics
with Little Class" (1992) 1 Social & Legal Studies 45.
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ought to value for their own sake. (4) The use of rights in contemporary
discourse impedes advances made by progressive social forces." 128
Because of these shortcomings, rights-talk is precluded from any political
effectiveness except for very transient advantages. 129 The root of all of these
limitations is apparently the fact that rights-talk takes place outside of a social
context; both the right and the incident analyzed are abstracted. Furthermore,
the individual rights-bearer him/herself is also abstracted and removed from a
social context, rendered autonomous. Therefore, his/her individual "awareness
of [his/her] connection to and mutual dependence upon others" is inhibited. 130
If the individual is configured in relation to others, some CLS critics argue that
such a relation is only made possible because the state has permitted its
existence. 131
Ultimately, the critics argue, rights are virtually useless if not harmful and all
that rights discourse will have succeeded in accomplishing is the creation of
false hopes and false consciousness on the part of the rights litigant. 132 Any
success derived from rights litigation has little impact and is used by the status
quo to prove that the existing system is just.
These rights critiques have themselves been critiqued particularly by
outsiders such as feminist and minority scholars. One of the main conten-
tions of such outsiders who disagree with the outright condemnation of
rights discourse is that the rights critiques fail to distinguish between
recognized legal rights and rights claims.133 For example, Elizabeth
Schneider, has argued from a feminist perspective, that rights critiques
fail to contemplate the dialectical relationship that she identifies
between "the assertion of rights and political struggle in social movement
128. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights" (1984) 62 Texas L. R. 1363 at 1363-4. See also
Trubek, "Where the Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism" (1984) 36
Stanford L.R. 575.
129. Ibid. at 1371, 1384.
130. E. Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the
Women's Movement" (1986) New York U. L. R. 589 at 595; Tushnet, ibid. at 1393.
131. P. Gabel, "The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the With-
drawn Selves" (1984) 62 Texas L. R. 1563 at 1577; see also Gabel & Harris,
"Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of
Law" (1983) in Critical Legal Studies, A. Hutchinson, ed. (New Jersey: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1989).
132. A.Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law," (1983) Wisconsin
L. R. 379 at 397.
133. For example, Bartholomew & Hunt, supra, note 126 at 9.
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practice."'134 According to Schneider, the claiming of a right is capable of
constituting a political statement and the process of asserting that right may in
itself be socially and politically transformative in its capacity to affect individ-
ual and collective consciousness. 135
Similarly, the minority critique of CLS arguments also emphasize the CLS
critiques' failure to recognize the political value of claiming rights.136 Patricia
Williams and Richard Delgado both suggest that the CLS condemnation and
dismissal of rights discourse is informed by a white, privileged experience
with rights, rather than a minority experience. 137 Delgado, in particular,
questions the authority of "radical" CLS scholars who conclude that rights
discourse only reinforces existing power structures, that some rights claims are
allowed only to quell the discontented masses. He counters that "minorities
know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the
Promised Land is at hand" and that they are, therefore, not duped by the
powers that be. Furthermore, Delgado challenges the assumption that all
successes in exercising rights will induce complacency; instead, he empha-
sizes that some "whet the appetite for further combat."'1 38 Essentially, Del-
gado emphasizes the paternalism of several of the CLS assumptions. He
maintains a bottom-up perspective which recognizes that piecemeal reform
sometimes brings victories which may seem very insignificant to a privileged
academic but extremely important to the historically victory-less.
Williams also questions the paternalistic approach of the CLS scholars in
assuming that rights claimants will fall victim to false consciousness. She
emphasizes that rights are not ends in themselves,139 and while she acknowl-
edges that rights may be indeterminate and unstable, 14° she rejects the conten-
134. Schneider, supra note 130 at 597.
135. Ibid. at 599, 611-18; see also F. Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of
Rights Analysis" (1984) 63 Texas L. R. 387 at 394,430.
136. P. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights"
(1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. R. 401; R. Delgado, "The Ethereal
Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?" (1987) 22
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. R. 301.
137. Williams, ibid. at 405-6:
It is my belief that blacks and whites do differ in the degree to which rights-asser-
tion is experienced as empowering or disempowering. The expression of these dif-
fering experiences creates a discourse boundary, reflecting complex and often
contradictory societal understandings.
See also Delgado, ibid.
138. Delgrado, supra, note 136 at 308.
139. Williams, supra, note 136 at 410.
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tion that these inherent characteristics render rights discourse useless. 141 Wil-
liarns acknowledges the symbolic significance of rights discourse for outsiders:
"For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all
the denied aspects of humanity: rights imply a respect which places one
within the referential range of self and others, which elevates one's status
from human body to social being. For blacks, then, the attainment of rights
signifies the dues, the respectful behaviour, the collective responsibility prop-
erly owed by a society to one of its own." 142
Essentially, rights discourse has the potential of raising consciousness, not
instilling false consciousness. 143 It is not the right itself that holds this poten-
tial but the process of engaging in the discourse of rights.
The crucial contention of all of these counterarguments to rights critiques is
that CLS arguments are themselves abstract in that they fail to consider the
perspectives of outsiders. Perhaps rights discourse is an insufficient mecha-
nism for achieving the ultimate new world order that some CLS scholars
envision. Dismissing rights discourse because of this, however, sacrifices the
potential intermediary benefits of rights discourse afforded to outsiders. To
reject rights discourse is to maintain the perspective of privileged scholars
much like, in their argument, embracing rights discourse maintains the privi-
lege of individuals of status quo social arrangements.
More recent voices in the rights debate have emphasized that a further diffi-
culty with rights critiques is their conflation of "rights" and "litigation." 144
The problem of abstracting experiences and individualizing rights claims as
though they are separate from a broader social context might more appropriately
140. Ibid at 409.
141. Ibid at 410: "While rights themselves may not be ends in themselves, it remains
that rights rhetoric has been and continues to be an effective form of discourse for
blacks. The vocabulary of rights speaks to an establishment that values the guise of
stability, and from whom social change for the better must come...Change argued
for in sheep's clothing of stability (ie "rights") can be effective, even as it destabi-
lizes certain other establishment values...The subtlety of rights' real instability thus
does not render unusable their persona of stability."
142. Ibid at 416.
143. See also Delgado, supra, note 135 at 305:
"Crits argue that rights separate and alienate the individual from the rest of the
human community. This may be true for the hard-working Crits who spend much of
their lives in their studies and law offices. For minorities, however, rights serve as a
rallying point and bring us closer together."
144. See A. Hunt, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies"
(1990) 17 J.L. and Society 309 at 309, 317.
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be seen as a product of litigation rather than of rights discourse per se.145
Similarly, the contention that rights bring only insignificant victories might be
shortsighted: the actual demand made in any specific case might be relatively
minor 146 but the mobilization around the issue and the process involved in
making and deliberating the claim may in fact be quite significant in terms of
awareness and structural change. 147 Alan Hunt also argues that litigation that
"fails" may,"paradoxically, provide the conditions of "success" that compel a
movement forward."' 148
The emerging ideas in the rights debate represent a move away from pro- and
anti-rights stances. 149 Instead, the focus is on how to engage in rights dis-
course as a counter-hegemonic strategy.150 Fudge and Glasbeek describe
"hegemony" as
a form of rule which exists not only in political institutions and relations but
also in active forms of experience and consciousness." 15 1
Under this form of rule, the ruling class [the insiders] convinces the subordi-
nate classes [outsiders] to internalize the ruling class's "norms" and its values.
Because the reality of the experiences of the outsiders conflicts with the norms
which they internalize, hegemony must always be "reforged and rein-
forced."152 Rights discourse, the assertion of and mobilization around rights,
may possess the potential to constitute counter-hegemony, to challenge and
dismantle existing hegemony such that perspectives and values other than
those of the ruling class might come to exist in political institutions and
relations, in active forms of experience and consciousness. 153
145. Ibid. at 317-18.
146. This suggestion is only for the purpose of the following argument. I still acknowl-
edge that "minor" is a judgement that could very well differ between outsider and
insider perspectives.
147. Hunt, supra, note 144 at 319. Hunt uses the example of litigation around single
issues that are significant for larger movements such as the abortion issue for the
women's movement.
148. Ibid. at 320.
149. See Bartholomew & Hunt, supra, note 126 at 53.
150. See Hunt, supra, note 144; Fudge and Glasbeek, supra, note 127.
151. Fudge and Glasbeek, supra, note 126 at 46.
152. Ibid. at 46.
153. Ibid. at 47.
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4.2.2 The Debate and the Addition of "Poverty"
Rather than precluding the idea of expanding the Ontario Human Rights Code
to include "poverty," the rights debate merely emphasizes that the process
involved in adding the section as well as the process involved in using it are
more crucial than the mere fact of its inclusion.
The debate also suggests that the addition of "poverty" cannot be a strictly
legal strategy; it must be primarily both social and political. As such, the
process around its addition and use must begin and continue with the involve-
ment of people in poverty and anti-poverty groups. As indicated at the very
beginning of this paper, the idea of expanding the Ontario Human Rights Code
appears to have grown out of at least part of the poverty community.154
In this regard, outsiders must be directly involved in the process of legislative
reform discussed in this paper such that the reform "respond[s] to [the]
strategic needs that emerge as poor people mobilize." 155 With this involve-
ment, the legislation and its use is more apt to reflect outsider perspectives. In
other words, a truly counter-hegemonic strategy would be one which engages
with outsiders such that it is the outsiders who challenge the hegemony with
their own perspectives and experiences and not insiders who purport to
challenge the hegemony with their interpretation of outsider perspectives.156
A very specific aspect that mandates the involvement of outsiders is the wording
of the legislation. I have consciously refrained from discussing how a section
including poverty would be worded because something so defining and crucial
as the articulation of this section could only be achieved by the outsiders with
the relevant experience and understanding of the discrimination.
The success of the addition and use of "poverty" must also be ultimately deter-
mined by outsiders. Whether the accommodation and services secured through
the invocation of the section or the degree of awareness achieved through its
proactive use are important and worthy of the effort involved must be judged
by the outsiders whose lives are most affected by the section and its use.
5 Conceptions of Discrimination
One of the difficulties of this paper is that in arguing for the inclusion of
"poverty" in the Ontario Human Rights Code, it may appear that I am perceiv-
154. Supra, note 6.
155. L. E.White, "Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor" (1990)
56 Brooklyn L. R. 861 at 872.
156. See L. E.White, "To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on Lawyering
and Power" (1988) Wisconsin L. R. 698 at 739-42.
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ing povertyism as a narrow experience where the discrimination relates only or
mostly to the low income level of the victim. It may also appear that I am
suggesting that every person who is a victim of povertyism has had the same
kind of experience. The stories opening this paper are testimony that such
suggestions are untrue. Neither all people in poverty nor their experiences of
povertyism are homogeneous. Furthermore, poverty is not the determining
characteristic of a person's social identity.
The categorical structure of the Human Rights Code would suggest that
discrimination is divisible along lines of race, gender, ableness, age, sexual
orientation, and family and marital status. Adding poverty to this list of
grounds, then, might also suggest that povertyism is separable from
experiences such as racism and sexism. Both the structure of the legislation
and the discourse on discrimination predisposes victims of discrimination and
their counsel to choose between the various grounds available in order to
identify the discrimination experienced. Victims are required to fit their expe-
rience into the structure of the legislation.
Discrimination, however, may be an act and experience consisting of various
components of any one individual's identity. A focus on a person's low
economic status in isolation from his/her other social identities such as gender,
race, ableness, sexual orientation and age could well present an inaccurate
depiction of the actual experiences of victims of discrimination.
Turning to the Ontario Human Rights Code as a mechanism for addressing
povertyism may implicitly appear to accept the structural framework of the
legislation and the complaints process. In fact, however, it is the problems of
this framework that mandate a focus on the Code and its failure to consider
poverty. Arguing for the inclusion of economic status challenges the existing
categories of the Code. It forces the Code to consider the experiences of the
economically disadvantaged members of the disadvantaged groups already
protected by the existing categories. *
Adding poverty to the Ontario Human Rights Code is not an attempt to protect
a large group of people currently unprotected by the Code. Adding poverty
would provide a different kind of protection to sub-groups of people who are
currently only partially protected by the Ontario Human Rights Code.
In the following section, I will highlight the difficulties with a categorical
approach to conceptualizations of discrimination and oppression generally. I
will then focus specifically on how the absence of "poverty" in the Ontario
Human Rights Code guarantees the legislation's inability to respond to the
very real experiences of discrimination for disadvantaged people and ensures
that the legislation will only benefit the most economically privileged of the
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protected groups. Finally, I will emphasize that the existing approach to
discrimination reflected in the Ontario Human Rights Code is an example of a
top-down approach.
5.1 Analyses of Discrimination
5.1.1 Categorical Analyses
Scholarship in various fields of social science, including law, feminism,
anthropology and sociology has tended to divide discussions of oppression
and discrimination into watertight compartments or categories such as class,
gender, and race.
a. Experience
The result of analyses which adopt such an approach is an outright inability to
reflect the actual experiences of people who are members of more than one
marginalized group. The analysis is defined by a categorical structure uncon-
nected to real social experience. Whereas the analysis might privilege one part
of a group's identity as determinative of the oppressive experience, many
people experience oppression as the culmination of having a social identity
with several marginalized components. Marlee Kline has noted the simulta-
neous nature of the experience of discrimination:
"Descriptions and analyses by black women, First Nations women, Asian
women, South Asian women, and other women of colour clearly demonstrate
that these women cannot overlook or dismiss the complexity of interaction
between racism, sexism and class oppression in their lives. Women of colour
tend to experience various forms of oppression simultaneously. As a result,
they find it difficult, if not impossible, to separate experiences they attribute to
their gender from those ascribed to their race, class or other differentiating
characteristics." 157
Such simultaneity of experience and the difficulty of framing the experience
under the framework of one area of discrimination might be observed in the
situation of Jane Doe at the Student Awards office. She experienced discrimi-
nation in terms of receiving an inferior quality of service from the Awards
Officer. Even if the Ontario Human Rights Code included poverty as a
grounds of discrimination, her poverty, evidenced by her lack of employment
and income from Family Benefits, may not have been what Jane perceived as
the primary basis for the differential treatment. Similarly, the assumptions
made by the Awards Officer may not have been related entirely to Jane's low
economic status. Several other factors could well have been informing the
157. M. Kline, "Women's Oppression and Racism: A Critique of the "Feminist Stand-
point"" in J. Vorst, ed., Race Class, Gender: Bonds and Barriers (Toronto:
Between the Lines/The Society for Socialist Studies, 1989) 37-64 at 43.
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whole incident: her race and any stereotypes about inferior motivation or
intelligence associated with it, her marital and family status as a single mother
with any stereotypes associated with single mothers such as irresponsibility,
her age as a mature student, or her gender. Clearly, it would be difficult initially
to separate the grounds of discrimination and ultimately to base any claim of
discrimination on any one ground.
The root of the difficulty with categorical approaches in social analyses is that
they begin with pre-defined concepts extracted from social experience. These
extractions are then studied as isolated units and once some "understanding"
of the units is achieved, they are reapplied to experience. An analogy might be
drawn to a designer removing a garment from a person, analyzing it, reducing
it to a pattern, handing only that pattern back to the person and then expecting
her to wear that in public. Once the "categories" are removed from social
reality they are severed from the other overlapping experiences that give the
"category" meaning for any one particular group or individual. As Roxanna
Ng suggests,
"the difficulties encountered by these [social] theorists in understanding the
interrelationship between ethnicity and class has to do with the fact that they
treat these phenomena as analytic categories whose relationship to each other
can be established only abstractly, through the construction of clever analytic
schema developed to discover correlations between variables. In this kind of
approach, ethnicity and class are conceptualized as variables which have no
actual relationship to one another in the everyday world...." 158
In the every day world, people's experiences do not conform to "clever
analytic schema."
If anti-discrimination legislation is to respond to and protect victims of dis-
crimination in the every day world, it cannot simply follow a categorical
approach. Asking a complainant to decide which ground to base her/his
complaint on is asking him/her to separate her/his experiences, to draw arbi-
trary and inaccurate divisions in her/his identity. The complainant bears the
burden of reducing her experience to a fiction for the convenience of the
legislative scheme.
b. Privilege/Marginalization
Kimberle Crenshaw has illustrated further that, in the context of anti-discrim-
ination legislation, a categorical approach or, in her words, a "single-axis
approach ' 159 serves to once again marginalize victims who are already most
158. R. Ng, "Sexism, Racism, Nationalism" in Jesse Vorst, ed. Race, Class, Gender:
Bonds and Barriers (Toronto: Between the Linesifhe Society for Socialist Studies,
1989) 10-25 at 13.
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marginalized in society. The experiences of the single categories are defined
by the perspective of the more privileged members of that category. With
respect to the experiences of Black women, for example, Crenshaw notes that
"in race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of
sex- or class-privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on
race- and class-privileged women." 160
As people who are actually experiencing discrimination as a result of multiple
aspects of the identity tailor their experience to fit the legislation, they actually
reinforce the privileged conceptions of categorical discrimination described by
Crenshaw. In the case of women of colour, for example, Nitya Duclos notes
that
"The law as it stands requires racial minority women to become what they are
not. In order to win a discrimination case they must make themselves into
people who diverge from the dominant group in only one respect." 16 1
In effect, then, the categorical nature of the legislation leads to a privileged
construction of the discrimination which not only fails to reflect the experience
of victims but also forces them to participate in their own marginalization.
In the context of povertyism, a manifestation of this problem would be a
situation where conceptions of poverty and povertyism are defined in the
context of the experiences of white males in poverty. An example of the
problem with such an analysis is that services like childcare would not be seen
as a poverty issue. Instead, they would be constructed as "women's" or gender
issues. As a gender issue, childcare services would likely then be approached
with a distinctly middle class perspective.
Altough the categorical human rights legislation is attempting to protect peo-
ple in marginalized groups, it protects the most privileged people of those
groups. The most privileged are those who belong to one group alone.
5.1.2 Additive Analyses
Whereas a categorical approach to discrimination would tend to isolate the
experience of discrimination by mandating either/or considerations, an addi-
tive approach 162 would recognize that victims of discrimination are sometimes
159. K. Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi-
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Poli-
tics" (1989) The University Of Chicago Legal Forum 139 at 139.
160. Ibid. at 140.
161. N. Duclos, "Disappearing Women: Racial Minority Women in Human Rights
Cases" (1993) 5 Canadian J. of Women and the L. at 39.
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members of more than one protected group. An additive approach would
enable a claimant to conjoin grounds, to graft one form of discrimination onto
another. An example might be the homeless women surveyed by Street Health.
If they or a group on their behalf were to bring a Human Rights claim because
of the discriminatory treatment they experienced in the context of health
services, an additive approach to discrimination would enable them to make
their claim as women and as people in poverty, on the on the basis of both
poverty and gender, if both factors informed their experiences.
a. PrivilegelMarginalization
Even where two categories are analyzed together, however, one is often
reduced into an extension or peripheral concern of the other. For exam-
ple, a Marxist analysis that also considers aspects of race or ethnicity
will premise its analysis on class structure and then explain the exis-
tence of race differences and problems in terms of class rather than in its
own right. Similarly, a feminist analysis that focusses on male oppres-
sion will define all women's experience of discrimination primarily in
terms of gender and issues of race and class become more of an after-
thought.
Sharene Razack has examined this additive approach in terms of the tendency
of feminist theory to consider issues of race and class as "background scenery"
in the larger picture of male oppression:
"Along the path to a more inclusive feminist theory and practice, it is tempting
to reduce the theoretical and practical tasks at hand to merely "adding" on
layers of oppression by grafting racism on to sexism, as understood by white
women." 163
The difficulty with this approach is that a substantial part of some people's
social identity becomes a subordinated issue.
As an example, consider again the women in the Street Health survey. An
additive approach might focus, first, on the poverty issue analyzed primarily
from a male perspective. The second addition to the analyses might then be the
outstanding issues of gender.
Therefore, additive approaches reflect the privileged perspective of the
analyzers. In terms of some feminist theory, for example, white middle class
162. Another term for an additive approach to discrimination is "double discrimination."
See P. Smith, "Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII" (1991) 14
Harvard Women's L. J. 21 at 27.
163. S. Razack. "Speaking For Ourselves: Feminist Jurisprudence and Minority
Women" (1992) 4 Canadian J. of Women and the L. 440 at 454.
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feminists focus primarily on gender because their privileged whiteness and
economic positions do not inform their experience of discrimination. Razack
illustrates this problem with additive analysis through an analogy articulated
by Elizabeth Spelman:
"Additive analysis...is comparable to inviting someone to your home. The
gesture is superficially inclusive but the guest visits under the terms of the
host and is only there at the latter's desire." 164
This difficulty has been illustrated in some American anti-discrimination
jurisprudence in cases involving what has been termed a "sex-plus"
discrimination-discrimination involving sex and another category. 165
In a situation involving discrimination against Black women, for example,
such an approach focuses on the fact that the complainant is a woman and then
turns to her being Black as a secondary concern. Black women are then
considered a sub-class protected by the anti-discrimination legislation. 166
This additive approach, like the categorical approach, essentially imposes the
same impossible choice on people of two disadvantaged groups with one slight
difference: instead of deciding which ground under which they must frame
their entire claim, they must decide which ground reflects the principal part of
their identity and which reflects the subordinate part.167
b. Experience
A further difficulty with additive approaches is that, like categorical
approaches, they do not adequately reflect the experience of the victim of
discrimination or the assumptions implicit in the act of discrimination. The
reason for this problem is that at the root of additive analyses are categorical
compartments. Additive approaches are really simply evolved stages of cate-
gorical approaches.
Consider, for example, the sexual harassment of women of colour. A categori-
cal approach would require the victims to decide whether what they experi-
enced was sexual or racial discrimination. If they chose (or had chosen for
them) sexual discrimination, issues of race would not enter the consideration
of the experience of harassment.
164. Ibid.
165. C. Scarborough. "Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Experiences"
(1989), 98 Yale L. J. 1457 at 1469. See also Smith, supra, note 162 at 40.
166. Ibid. See specificallyJeffries v. Harris CommunityActionAss'n, F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.
1980).
167. See Scarborough, supra, note 165 at 1471.
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An additive approach would enable a victim to claim both racial discrimina-
tion and sexual discrimination; however, as Crenshaw has indicated, the dis-
course of sexual and racial discrimination have developed from privileged
perspectives and neither will adequately explain all situations of sexual harass-
ment of women of colour.
For example, a Black female victim of sexual harassment might have been
harassed or might perceive the harassment as inextricably linked to the stereo-
typical assumptions surrounding the sexuality of black women and the Black
female slave experience of sexual exploitation by white slavemasters. 168 Sim-
ilarly, a Chinese woman's experience of sexual harassment might arise
directly from popular portrayals of Chinese women as passive and sex-
slaves to white men.169
In these situations, the black female victim is not experiencing discrimination
because she is a woman and because she is black. She is experiencing discrim-
ination because she is a black woman. Similarly, the Chinese woman is
experiencing harassment because she is a Chinese woman.
Sexual harassment is an example used by several writers challenging categor-
ical approaches in anti-discrimination legislation. However, these examples
could be further complicated by considerations of economic status. A woman
of colour in a low-paying job may be particularly vulnerable to a harassing
employer who knows that her economic status and that of her children depend
on the job that he has the power to terminate. Furthermore, if the woman is a
poor single mother, assumptions about promiscuity may also inform a
harasser's assumptions about his victim, particularly if he knows her children
were born outside of marriage.
As the above examples illustrate, to approach the experiences of these victims
within an additive framework would fail to comprehend the interactive nature
of the discrimination.
168. See E. C. Jordan. "Race, Gender, and Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harass-
ment Hearings: The Hidden Fault Lines in Political Discourse" (1992) 15 Harvard
Women's L. J. 1 at 17-19. See also J. Winston, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title
VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act
of 1990" (1991) 79 California Law Rev. 775 at 785; "society continues to exploit
black women sexually and to perpetuate the perception that they invite sexual
encounters and abuse."
169. See Winston, ibid. at 785; "The modem American film industry portrays Asian
women as stereotypical passive figures whose main purpose in life is to serve either
as love interests for white men, or as devious madames and untrustworthy prostitutes."
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5.1.3 Interactive Discrimination
"Interactive discrimination" is an approach to discrimination that acknowl-
edges the overlapping, indistinguishable and mutually informing nature of
discrimination as an act and experience. For example, the women in the Street
Health survey might make a claim that they were discriminated against, not as
woman and as people in poverty, but as women in poverty.
a. Experience
Arguing for an interactive approach to considerations of discrimination is not
to replace one categorical analysis with another. In other words, it is not to
suggest, that every incident of discrimination involving a victim from multiple
marginal groups calls into play every aspect of her/his identity. Not all discrim-
ination is interactive discrimination.
The goal of arguing for an interactive consideration of discrimination is to
argue for a legislative scheme and judicial understanding that is as flexible and
dynamic as life itself. It is extremely important that, even if we attain a forum
for understanding interactive discrimination, we do not automatically presume
that all aspects of a person's identity are relevant to the discrimination exam-
ined. Crenshaw notes that the experience of people who fall under more than
one "category" do not always experience the effects of being members of that
category in the same way. Again working from the perspective of Black
women, Crenshaw illustrates the variety of possible experiences:
"Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white
women's experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with
Black men. Yet often they experience double discrimination-the combined
effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of
sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women-not
the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women." 170
Therefore, what is important is that we approach discrimination with a bottom-
up perspective. We must consider specifically what the effect of any one
incident is on the specific victim. We must make space for the most disadvan-
taged people in society to adequately articulate their experience and we must
have in place a system that will respond with adequate understanding and
redress.
b. Privilege: A Bottom-Up Perspective
Throughout this paper, I have argued that a bottom-up perspective must be that
of the most disadvantaged people in society, the people most likely to be
discriminated against and most in need of a mechanism of redress.
170. Supra, note 159 at 149.
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As argued above, the most disadvantaged people in society are those who are
members of several marginalized groups. Without "poverty" and without a
mechanism for an interactive approach to discrimination, the Ontario Human
Rights Code is unable to conceive of the complexity of experience of those
who are most disadvantaged, those who have the least political influence, the
least economic power, and the most silenced voices.
A piece of legislation with such an inability is a piece of legislation that
reinforces a top-down approach. As Crenshaw indicated, when discrimination
is discussed as divisible along fixed grounds, the result is a privileged concep-
tion of discrimination. Anti-discrimination legislation so constructed protects
people who are disadvantaged because they are members of a marginalized
group. However, the legislation is still framed from the perspective of the top
of that disadvantaged group.
A bottom-up perspective would emphasize that there is not one common
experience of racism, sexism, ablism, heterosexism, agism, and povertyism
and that these "categories" frequently overlap and are indistinguishable.
c. Some Complications
Although anti-discrimination legislation which proceeds on an understanding
of interactive discrimination would be ideal for protecting the most disadvan-
taged of marginalized people, it is a difficult concept to implement. Jody
Freeman, in a discussion of the factum submitted by Egale (Equality for Gays
and Lesbians Everywhere) et al. in Mossop v. Canada (A.G.),171 described
some of the difficulties of attempting to explain interactive discrimination to
the judiciary. 172 As she notes,
"The effects of multiple discrimination are so entangled that they seem
intransigent in the face of analytical attempts to separate them." 173
In the American context, the potential complications of additive analysis alone
has sufficed to scare some courts into extremely resistant reactions. For exam-
ple, the court in one case 174 limited the "sex-plus" approach to a single plus. In
other words, a Black single mother who felt she had been discriminated
against on the grounds of gender, race and family status would only be allowed
171. (1993) (SCC) [unreported].
172. J. Freeman, "Defining Family in Mossop v. DSS: The Challenge of Anti-Essential-
ism and Interactive Discrimination for Human Rights Litigation" University of
Toronto Feminism and the Law Workshop Series (November 1992).
173. Ibid. at 31.
174. Judge v. Marsh., 649 F.Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
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to choose gender and one of the other two grounds. The court commented that
it intended to preclude the possibility of the legislation being "splintered
beyond use and recognition" and becoming a "many-headed Hydra, impossi-
ble to contain." 175
One particular problem with attempting to argue a perspective of interactive
discrimination is that the adjudicative body might somehow perceive the
difficulty of the concept as the fault of the complainant. Duclos illustrates this
problem by noting that
"If the complainant straddles too many categories, she is increasingly likely to
lose her balance and fall through the cracks: it is no longer discrimination, it
is "just her"... 176
These potential difficulties are not sufficient reasons for abandoning attempts
to work towards legislative and judicial understandings of the interactive
nature of discrimination. Furthermore, as indicated above, to avoid pro-
blematizing existing conceptions of discrimination analyses is to accept the
status quo categorical and occasionally additive approach to discrimination
which is inherently privileged. Only those whose experience is closest to the
"norm" can afford not to problematize existing categorical conceptions. Patri-
cia Williams eloquently illustrates the need to confront complication instead of
hiding behind neat legal frameworks:
"That life is complicated is a fact of great analytic importance. Law often
seeks to avoid this truth by making up its own breed of narrower, simpler, but
hypnotically powerful rhetorical truths. Acknowledging, challenging, playing
with these as rhetorical gestures is, it seems to me, necessary for any concep-
tion of justice. Such acknowledgement complicates the supposed purity of
gender, race, voice, boundary; it allows us to acknowledge the utility of such
categorizations for certain purposes and the necessity of their breakdown on
other occasions. It complicates definitions in its shift, in its expansion and
contraction according to circumstance, in its room for the possibility of
creatively mated taxonomies and their wildly unpredictable offspring." 17 7
175. Ibid. at 780. See Scarborough, supra, note 165 at 1471-3. Note also that an Ameri-
can court in an earlier case expressed reluctance to possibility of even "sex plus"
and maintained that allowing the combination would "clearly rais[e] the prospect of
opening the hackneyed Pandora's box"; Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly
Division, 413 F.Supp. 142 (E.D. Miss. 1976) at 145. For discussion, see Scarbor-
ough, supra, note 165 at 1468; Crenshaw, supra, note 160 at 141-3; Smith, supra,
note 162 at 30.
176. Supra, note 161 at 35.
177. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Cambridge:
Harvard U.P., 1991) at 10-11. Also cited in Duclos, ibid. at 48-9.
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The relatively recent proliferation of scholarship on the concept of interactive
discrimination, or at least on the inadequacies of categorical and additive
analyses of discrimination might suggest a mounting challenge to current
anti-discrimination legislation.
5.2 The Heterogeneity of Povertyism
At the beginning of this section, I emphasized that in discussing the assump-
tions underlying povertyism, I am not suggesting that it is always experienced
in the same way. One factor which might create differences are the varying
stereotypes of the poor, depending on whether they are perceived to be
"deserving" or "undeserving." The distinction of deserving or undeserving
will often also relate directly to other characteristics of that person's identity
which are in themselves grounds of discrimination.
For example, the assumptions made about an unemployed young black male,
a pregnant single mother on welfare, a Native woman living on the street, a
young white schizophrenic street youth, or an unemployed lesbian couple with
children may vary widely. The factors influencing those assumptions, other
than but directly related to economic status and source of income, would
include race, family status, marital status, age, mental ability, sexual orienta-
tion, and pregnancy.
Therefore, just as Crenshaw illustrated in the context of racism, the experience
of povertyism will vary for individuals depending on their circumstances and
the other aspects of their identity; For example, in Jane's story, the telephone
company had a policy in place that adversely discriminated against people in
poverty. This particular experience of povertyism may not necessarily be
interactive whereas Jane's experience with the Student Awards Officer is more
likely interactive.
5.3 The Faces of People in Poverty
The experience of povertyism is also particularly complicated in that the reason
that some individuals are poor and the nature of their experience of poverty
itself is directly related and arguably caused by other aspects of their identity
and experiences of discrimination. The current and persistent distribution of
poverty in Canada illustrates that poverty is often directly related to other parts of
people's identity which are also often other grounds of discrimination.
A disproportionate number of Canadian women as compared to men will
experience poverty in their lifetime.178 The National Council of Welfare, in
178. Gunderson & Muszynski, Women and Labour Market Poverty (Ottawa: Canadian
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1990) at 8.
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their 1990 report, "Women and Poverty Revisited," noted that 60% of
Canada's poor are women. 179 Many of these women are single mothers: 57%
of all single mothers live in poverty,180 which makes family status a factor of
poverty. 181
Older women also face a higher chance of living in poverty than older
men: unattached women over 65 years old face a 44% chance of being
poor 182 and the overall poverty rate for elderly women is double the rate
for elderly men (22% as compared to 11%).183 Age is also a factor on
the other end of the continue, as one in six Canadian children are living
in poverty.184
Like gender and age, disability is often a contributing factor in the distribution
of poverty. The majority of Canadians with disabilities live below the poverty
line. Sixteen percent of the Canadian population have disabilities and, of this
group, according to 1986 statistics, 16% of women and 5% of men had no
income. Of those that did have income, "76% of the women and 50% of the
men received less than $10,000."185 The National Council of Welfare noted
that what is particularly distressing about these statistics is that, while people
with disabilities earn less than abled people and, proportionately, more of them
are living in poverty, persons "with serious physical impairments need more
money than other people to maintain the same standard of living." 186 Their
increased needs include medical supplies and prescriptions as well as costs
arising from their need for help in completing daily chores such as shopping,
cleaning, or travelling. 187 When disability and family status collide, these
179. National Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited, (Summer 1990) at 1;
[hereinafter NCW].
180. Ibid. at 2. Note also that "half of all women using food banks are single mothers."
See S. Cox, "Women Using Food Banks" 12 Canadian Woman Studies 48.
181. Gunderson & Muszynski, supra, note 178 at 16-22.
182. Ibid. at 9.
183. Ibid. at 2.
184. "Children in Poverty: Toward a Better Future" (1992) 12 Canadian Woman Studies
74.
185. NCW, supra, note 179 at 115. For a more detailed analysis of specific factors con-
tributing to the impoverishment of disabled women, see M. Barile, "Disabled
Women: An Exploited Underclass" 12 Canadian Woman Studies 32 at 33.
186. NCW, ibid. at 117.
187. Ibid.
(1993) 9 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
costs increase as disabled single mothers are faced with extensive chores
relating to childcare.188
Finally, recent immigrants and people belonging to visible minority groups
also face a disproportionate chance of living in poverty. In particular,
immigrants from countries with mostly Black populations as well as native
Black Canadians experience discrimination in the workforce regularly. At least
one study has suggested that, in Toronto alone, "whites have three job pros-
pects to every one for blacks." 189 Furthermore, immigrants from these coun-
tries also receive lower salaries than immigrants with similar qualifications
from other countries. 190
The poverty rate among aboriginal people is unknown but statistics have
shown that a disproportionate number of aboriginal people have no income at
all. Among those aboriginal people that do have incomes, the average incomes
are significantly lower than those of the rest of Canadians. 191 A further
consideration is that the average number of single mothers among aboriginal
women is higher than that of other Canadians. 192
The relationship between the existing protected grounds in the Ontario Human
Rights Code and the distribution of poverty suggests that extending the Code
to include poverty would conceivably mandate an interactive approach to
discrimination. The inclusion of poverty would challenge the discrete categor-
ical structure of the Code, introducing a new dynamic between the grounds. A
person in poverty might perceive herself to be poor because she is female, has
a disability, is a single mother, is a person of colour, or because of any
combination of these possibilities. However, a similar observation cannot
readily be made with the other grounds: no one is of colour because of their
gender or female because of their marital status. The very nature of poverty,
then, refutes a strict categorical analyses.
188. Ibid
189. Ibid. at 119.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid. at 112. In 1985, 25% of aboriginal women had no income and the average
income for the remainder of the group was $9,828; 19% of Canadian women had no
income and the average income for the rest was $12,615. Also, 13% of aboriginal
men had no income and the rest averaged $15,760; 7% of Canadian men had no
income while the rest averaged $23,265; see also "Economic Issues Facing Native
Women in Ontario" (1987) 4 Currents, Readings in Race Relations 6 at 7.
192. Ibid. at 113.
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5.4 A Subjective Perspective of Discrimination
A differentiation made several times in this section has been between what the
victim of discrimination experiences and what the discriminator perpetrates. A
bottom-up approach to discrimination would emphasize the perspective of the
outsider, the person belonging to the disadvantaged group protected by the
Ontario Human Rights Code.
A piece of legislation that is one of the primary mechanisms for hearing the
exclusion stories of outsiders must be flexible enough to hear the victim's
subjective perspectives of the nature of the discrimination experienced. Ide-
ally, a victim of discrimination should be able to articulate her complaint as he
experienced it. Occasionally, the discriminator might not even consider part of
what the victim alleges. For example, a victim might claim she has been
discriminated against as a woman of colour when the discriminator discrimi-
nated against her as a woman. If the victim were given the opportunity to
frame her complaint as she perceived it, at the very least a dialogue might be
started, the victim's perspective would be heard, the discriminator might
realize that race did factor into his behaviour, and overall, a learning process
will have begun.
6. Conclusion
Overall, any argument advocating the inclusion of poverty in the Human
Rights Code must realize that poverty and povertyism have different meanings
for different people in poverty, depending on various other components of
their social identities. The inclusion of poverty will introduce a new dynamic
to the legislation. To facilitate the adequate protection of people with claims
based on this ground and to address the needs of the disadvantaged of the
disadvantaged, an interactive approach to discrimination must be understood
and implemented.
